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ABSTRACT 
 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) does not have 
adequate tools to prevent creeping acquisitions under the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA). 
 
Section 50 of the CCA prohibits a corporation from acquiring shares or assets if the 
acquisition would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially 
lessening competition in any market. The expression ‘creeping acquisitions’ refers to 
a number of small individual mergers or acquisitions that, when considered in 
isolation, do not have a sufficient impact on competition to breach s 50, but when 
considered together, have a cumulative effect of substantially lessening competition in 
a market.1 This seeming loophole in s 50 enables entities, particularly those with 
significant market power, to continue to grow in dominance, potentially to the 
detriment of incumbents and consumers.  
 
The Director of the National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia (NARGA), 
Mr Alan McKenzie, summarised the problem of creeping acquisitions: 
 
Section 50 has shown itself to be unable to deal with a series of small acquisitions undertaken 
by a company with a large market share over a period of time. While each individual 
acquisition does not have the effect of substantially lessening competition, the overall impact 
is one that potentially can substantially lessen competition. So, for example, if a major chain 
were to buy out 100 stores in one go, that would very much come under the ACCC’s 
spotlight. But, if they make those same acquisitions over a period of years, piecemeal and one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Chris Bowen MP, ‘Creeping Acquisitions’ (Discussion Paper, Consumer Affairs, 5 August 2008). 
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by one as part of a strategic plan to acquire that same level of market share, it is very difficult 
for the commission to find that each acquisition on its own represents a substantial lessening 
of competition. That is the problem.2  
 
As a matter of principle, if the goal of s 50 is to prevent acquisitions which have the 
effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition, s 50 should not 
distinguish between one acquisition which creates this outcome and a group of 
acquisitions which collectively creates the same outcome. 
 
Further, creeping acquisitions have occurred in Australia. Over the past 40 years or 
so, ‘Australia has seen the demise of hundreds of small grocery stores, butchers, 
bakers, florists, greengrocers, pharmacists, newsagents, liquor outlets and other small 
retailers as a direct result of the continued expansion of major supermarket chains and 
major specialty retailers.’3 Some of this expansion has been organic. Significantly 
however, some has been due to creeping acquisitions. 
 
The resulting market power and vertical integration of the largest participants in the 
Australian grocery and food sector have led to a number of difficulties for other 
participants – including difficulties in suppliers having access to markets, difficulties 
in other participants competing and lower product choice for consumers (due to the 
way the largest participants have altered their product range in favour of their own 
private label products). This article takes a more expanded view of the type of 
competition that Australia should encourage, arguing that it should be more than low 
prices for the ultimate consumer. This article takes the view that product choice, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Senate Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia, The Effectiveness of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 in Protecting Small Business (2004) 60.  
3 Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, Parliament of Australia, Fair Market or Market 
Failure? A Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector (1999) (‘Baird Report’), vii.  
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access of suppliers to markets and smaller entities being able to compete with larger 
ones are worthy goals. 
 
The food and grocery sectors are not the only Australian industries with an 
oligopolistic nature. This article takes the view that if creeping acquisitions can occur 
in the food and grocery sector, then they could occur in other sectors. Accordingly, 
s 50 needs to be changed to prevent creeping acquisitions in those sectors. 
 
Viewing the utility of s 50 from that perspective, this article recommends legislative 
and administrative changes that would enable the ACCC and the Courts to adequately 
regulate creeping acquisitions. These include reinterpreting the objects clause of the 
CCA, aggregating all previous piecemeal acquisitions over a two-year period, 
mandatory notification and Commissioner’s declarations. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
ABS – Australian Bureau of Statistics 
 
ACCC – Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
 
ACT – Australian Competition Tribunal 
 
AER – Australian Energy Regulator 
 
AGL – Australian Gas and Lighting  
 
AIW – Australian Independent Wholesalers 
 
ALH – Australian Leisure and Hospitality Group 
 
ASX – Australian Securities Exchange (formerly, Australian Stock Exchange) 
 
BCA – Business Council of Australia 
 
CCA – Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
 
CMA – Competition Markets Authority 
 
CPI – Consumer Price Index 
 
CUB – Carlton & United Brewery 
 
DoJ – Department of Justice 
 
EC – European Communities 
 
ECMR – European Commission Merger Regulation 
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EU – European Union  
 
FCC – Federal Competition Commission (Comisión Federal de Competen) 
 
FLEC – Federal Law of Economic Competition 
 
FTC – Federal Trade Commission 
 
GDP  – Gross Domestic Product 
 
HHI – Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 
ICN – International Competition Network 
 
LCA – Law Council of Australia 
 
NARGA – National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia 
 
NEM – National Electricity Market 
 
NER – National Electricity Rules 
 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
 RBA – Reserve Bank of Australia 
 
SIW – Statewide Independent Wholesalers 
 
SLC – Substantial Lessening of Competition Test 
 
SMP – Substantial Market Power 
 
TPA – Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
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TPC – Trade Practices Commission 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The expression ‘creeping acquisitions’ refers to a number of small individual mergers 
or acquisitions that, when considered in isolation, do not have a sufficient impact on 
competition to breach s 50, but when considered together, have a cumulative effect of 
substantially lessening competition in a market.4 
 
This article addresses the failure of Australia’s current merger regime to adequately 
regulate and prevent creeping acquisitions.   
 
Significant research was conducted in preparing this article. This article has been 
presented in Six Chapters. Chapters One to Four discuss the creeping acquisition issue 
in the context of Australia’s current merger provisions. Chapter Four contrasts this to 
the regulatory approach taken by other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) jurisdictions. This draws out and critically analyses the 
strengths and weaknesses in Australia’s legislative regime. 
 
After discussing observations as to the scale and reach of the issue, Chapter Five will 
conclude with a number of recommendations. These include reinterpreting the objects 
clause of the CCA to widen the ambit of protections. They also include aggregating 
all previous piecemeal acquisitions over a two-year period so as to capture the totality 
of multiple transactions. They further include introducing additional mechanisms such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Bowen, above n 1. 
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as mandatory notification and Commissioner’s declarations to pinpoint firms or 
industries that may be predisposed to the engagement of this practice. 
 
This article will focus primarily on how this practice has impacted the Australian 
supermarket and grocery sector and from that extrapolate more broadly on the threat it 
poses to other markets. 
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CHAPTER TWO – IS THERE A NEED TO REGULATE CREEPING ACQUISITIONS IN 
AUSTRALIA? 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The preservation of competition is highly desirable – it brings about beneficial 
outcomes for consumers: lower prices, higher quality and greater variety of goods and 
services and continual innovation. By contrast, the broader economic impact of 
reduced competition is likely to include higher prices, reduced quality and variety of 
goods and services, fewer gains in efficiency and productivity and reduced 
innovation. 
 
Crucially, the process of competition necessitates competitors. The more efficient 
competitors there are in a market, the more competition there will be. As Professor 
Zumbo articulated: 
 
The greater the number of efficient competitors, the greater likelihood of vigorous 
competition in the market place. The fewer the competitors and the more concentrated the 
relevant market, the greater the likelihood of ‘price coordination’ or even collusion.5 
 
Of course, competition inevitably results in harm to less efficient competitors – they 
will at least have reduced sales and may eventually exit the market. So competition 
benefits consumers rather than competitors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Frank Zumbo, Submission No 14 to Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Trade Practices 
Amendment (Material Lessening of Competition – Richmond Amendment) Bill 2009, January 2010, 12. 
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As is discussed in Chapter Three, s 50 prohibits mergers and acquisitions that will 
have the effect or likely effect of substantially reducing competition in any market. 
But, as will be argued, s 50 essentially looks at each transaction in isolation. It doesn’t 
allow for aggregating successive transactions. This permits entities to circumvent the 
operation of s 50 by growing in market dominance through a succession of small 
transactions that are not large enough to attract the operation of s 50 – that is, creeping 
acquisitions. 
 
This Chapter essentially considers whether creeping acquisitions have occurred to 
date and whether there is a risk of them happening in the future. It argues that the 
supermarket sector has seen an increase in market concentration, partly due to 
creeping acquisitions. It argues that Australia has several oligopolistic markets that 
are susceptible to future creeping acquisitions. It also looks at some of the current 
characteristics of the supermarket industry and argues that these characteristics are not 
in the best interests of consumers or other market participants. 
 
In the following pages, this article pursues the implications of a statement made by 
Peter McDonald, Marketing Lecturer at Sydney University – namely, the anomaly of 
having two grocery chain owners dominating so many different sectors of the 
Australian market. 6 That leads to anti-competitive conduct which in other markets 
may not be considered so harmful – hence the strong emphasis in the following pages 
on consumer choice, the need to guard against predatory conduct and ‘predatory 
capacity’, the benefits of preserving small independent retailers and the growing 
significance of vertical integration. In many markets, conduct of this kind could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Sarah Whyte, Pharmacies Next Target Of Big Two, Say Analysts (2013) The Sydney Morning Herald 
<http://www.smh.com.au/data-point/pharmacies-next-target-of-big-two-say-analysts-2013092 
7-2ujm0.html>. 
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evidence of vigorous and even necessary competition. That is often not the case in the 
Australian grocery market. As a consequence, this article contains comments and 
observations which, at first glance, might seem insupportable in other markets but 
which, upon reflection, do have a clear method and intention about them. That should 
also be clear from the conclusions this article draws in Chapter Five – where 
suggestions are made to enlarge the CCA’s preamble, include an additional merger 
factor and provide for mandatory notification. All of these suggestions might appear 
unnecessary in normal, functional markets. However, this article argues that they are 
necessary in the present case. 
 
This article will now consider some of the inherent characteristics in Australian 
markets. Australia is a relatively young economy, which is geographically isolated 
from other large and influential markets and has a comparatively small population 
size. However, it possesses some of the most highly concentrated markets in the 
OECD.7 To illustrate this, Australia is a market of only 25 million people.8 It has a 
gross domestic product (GDP) of US$1,229.6 billion.9 By comparison, the European 
Union (EU) is a market of 508.5 million people with a GDP of US$16,224 billion,10 
and the North American Free Trade Area11 is a market of 476 million people with a 
GDP of US$20,650.4 billion.12 Despite its significantly smaller size, Australia has a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Rod Simms, ‘Thoughts on Market Concentration Issues’ (Speech delivered at the Australian Food 
and Grocery Council Industry Leaders Forum, Canberra, 30 October 2013). 
8 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2018), Australian Demographic Statistics, 
9 OECD (2017), OECD Economic Surveys: Australia 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-aus-2017-en>. 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3101.0>. 
10 OECD (2016), OECD Economic Surveys: European Union 2016, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-eur-2016-en>. 
11 Canada, Mexico and the United States 
12 OECD (2016), OECD Economic Surveys: United States 2016, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-usa-2016-en>; OECD (2016), OECD Economic Surveys: 
Canada 2016, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-can-2016-en>; OECD (2017), OECD Economic Surveys: 
13	  
	  
disproportionate number of Fortune top 500 global companies prevalent in the 
mining,13 banking,14 telecommunications15 and retailing industries.16  
 
A deeper examination of these industries highlights just how concentrated Australian 
markets are. In the supermarkets and grocery industry, the top three firms control over 
70% of the market, with Wesfarmers and Woolworths alone controlling 67.7%.17 In 
the banking and finance sector, the top four firms control over 70% of the market.18 In 
telecommunications, the top three firms control 65% of the market, with no firm in 
the remaining 35% controlling more than 5% market share.19 In the mining industry, 
the top two firms control approximately 30% market share, again with no other player 
controlling more than 5%.20 The definition of a major player is a company that 
operates primarily within the relevant industry and generates over 5% of industry 
revenue.21 Therefore, outside of these concentrated top firms, there are no major 
competitors in these markets. The table below compares the concentration levels in 
the Australian versus the US markets: 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Mexico 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-mex-2017-en> 
13 BHP-Billiton and Rio Tinto. 
14 National Australia Bank, Commonwealth Bank, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group and 
Westpac. 
15 Telstra alone exudes dominance generally, but also Optus and Vodafone in provision of specific 
services. 
16 Woolworths and Wesfarmers / Coles. 
17 Nathan Cloutman (on behalf of IBISWorld), Supermarkets and Grocery Stores in Australia, Industry 
Report G4111 (2018). 
18 Tommy Wu, Finance in Australia, IBISWorld Industry Report K6200 (2016). 
19 Brian Lo, Telecommunications Services in Australia, IBISWorld Industry Report J5800 (2017). 
20 Alen Allday, Mining in Australia, IBISWorld Industry Report B (2017).  
21 Lo, above n 19. 
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Table 1.1 Three stark examples: the US v Australia22 
Industry Market share of major AU firms Market share of major US firms 
Commercial banking 70% 28%23 
Supermarkets 80% 31%24 
Telecommunications 65% 30%25 
 
This composition is apparent in many other Australian markets including the airline,26 
paper and packaging,27 print media,28 and beer industries.29 
 
These characteristics increase the potential for firms to merge to achieve market 
power, or those holding substantial market power to exploit that power by engaging in 
uncompetitive behaviour.30 Australia’s comparatively small size and geographical 
isolation make the market less able to correct for prolonged anti-competitive 
behaviour. The market share of dominant firms and Australia’s isolation from the rest 
of the world create a sizeable barrier to entry.31 With the exception of concentration, 
no social, economic, political or legislative response can alter these characteristics.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Andy Kollmorgen, ‘Squeezing out the Competition’ Choice, 2016.  
23 Wells Fargo & Company (12.6%), JP Morgan Chase & Co. (9.1%) and Bank of America 
Corporation (7.1%) see Viraj D’Costa, Commercial Banking in the US, IBISWorld Industry Report 
52211 (2017). 
24 The Kroger Co (15.8%), Albertsons companies LLC (9.9%) and Publix Super Markets Inc. (5.7%) 
see Meghan Guattery, Supermarkets & Grocery Stores in the US, IBISWorld Industry Report  44511 
(2017). 
25 AT&T Inc. (20%), Century Link Inc. (7.4%) and Verizon Communications Link (3%). 
26 Virgin and Qantas. 
27 Visy and Amcor. 
28 News Corporation and Fairfax. 
29 Lion Nathan and Carlton United Breweries control over 90% of beer taps nationwide.  
30 Mika Oinonen, Does EU Merger Control Discriminate Against Small Markets Companies? 
Diagnosing the Argument with Conclusions (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 329. 
31 Frank Zumbo, ‘Don’t Bank on Bank Competition: The Case for Effective Laws Against Anti-
competitive Mergers and Creeping Acquisitions’ (2010) 18 Trade Practices Law Journal 26, 1-2. 
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This Chapter will examine Australia’s grocery industry – where creeping acquisitions 
have been the most prolific. As a microcosm of the Australian market place, the 
grocery sector provides a case study of the dangers associated with highly 
concentrated markets which have been partly achieved through creeping acquisitions. 
 
II CASE STUDY: THE SUPERMARKET AND GROCERY SECTOR - A MICROCOSM OF THE 
AUSTRALIAN MARKET PLACE  
 
A An Example of Creeping Acquisitions in Australia 
 
The creeping acquisition reforms suggested by this article have been influenced by 
Australia’s experience of creeping acquisitions in the food and grocery retailing sector 
and the adverse consequences of the current concentrated market structure for 
suppliers, competing smaller businesses and, to a lesser extent, consumers. It is 
acknowledged that not all increases in market power have been due to creeping 
acquisitions. The grocery sector has inherent features that make it susceptible to 
negative outcomes. These include very high levels of market concentration, extensive 
vertical integration32 and high barriers to entry for smaller competitors. The negative 
outcomes discussed below have a broader focus than just consumer welfare. It is 
acknowledged that the CCA is largely concerned with consumer welfare, through the 
protection of the process of competition (rather than competitors). However, this 
article argues for a broader focus. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Vertical integration is a strategy where a company expands its business operations into different 
steps on the same production path, such as when a manufacturer owns its supplier or distributor. 
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The Australian retailing sector provides a vast array of products to consumers through 
a wide range of outlets. Food retailing in Australia is defined under the Australian and 
New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification33 to include supermarkets and grocery 
stores (including convenience stores) and specialised food retailers.34  
 
Both Coles and Woolworths have a long history of expansion through acquisition. 
Rapid urbanisation in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s created economic conditions 
favouring the establishment of supermarkets as the dominant food store format. 
Woolworths and Coles moved away from variety store bases to supermarket 
operations through a combination of organic growth and acquisitions of small chains 
such as BCC in Brisbane and Flemings in Sydney.35 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Coles and Woolworths acquired four major competitor 
discount chains – Franklins in NSW; Bi-Lo in South Australia; Shoeys in Victoria and 
Jack the Slasher in Queensland.36 Within the same decade, another 126 Safeway 
stores in eastern Australia came under Woolworth’s ownership. 
 
In 1981, Woolworths moved into the electronics market with the acquisition of Dick 
Smith Electronics. This continued in 2001 with the acquisition of the Tandy chain in 
Australia from InterTan. In 1999, Coles expanded into computer hardware with the 
acquisition of Harris Technology. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Abs.gov.au, 1292.0 – Australian And New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC), 
2006 (Revision 2.0) (2015) <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/1292.0>. 
34 Specialised food retailers include retailers that sell fresh meat, fish and poultry, fruits and vegetables, 
confectionary, liquor, non-alcoholic drinks, small goods, baked goods not manufactured on premises, 
and any other specialised food items. 
35	  Kyle W Stiegart and Dong Hwan Kim, ‘Structural Changes In Food Retailing: Six Country Case 
Studies’ (2009) 22. 36	  Franklins, Submission to the Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, Parliament of Australia, 
Fair Market or Market Failure? A Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector (1999) 200.	  
17	  
	  
 
The late 1990s saw the expansion of Coles and Woolworths into ‘express’ or ‘metro’ 
stores. These scaled-down ‘convenience’ stores were located in high-traffic 
metropolitan areas and competed successfully against stores such as 7-Eleven by 
offering a better-balanced portfolio of products with high convenience and at more 
reasonable prices.  
 
A submission by NARGA in response to the Inquiry into the Competitiveness of 
Retail Prices for Standard Groceries (2008) (Grocery Inquiry) reported that 
acquisitions in the period of 1993-2007 represented 39% of the growth in the number 
of sites of major chains, making a substantial contribution to their market share 
growth over that period.37	   
 
In 1996, Bi-Lo, operated by Coles, acquired six Newmart discount supermarket stores 
in Western Australia. By 2002, this grew to 16 stores. In 1998, Woolworths expanded 
into the liquor businesses with the acquisition of Dan Murphy’s. 
 
The 2000s saw the acquisition of the retail fuel operations of Shell Australia, with the 
fuel outlets rebranded as Coles Express to counter Woolworths’ similar move with 
Caltex. These alliances with major petrol refiners/retailers and petrol store ownership 
enabled Coles and Woolworths to offer discount petrol as an incentive for customers 
who shop in their stores. 
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  National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia Pty Ltd, Submission to the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, ‘Creeping Acquisitions’ (2008) 3.	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In 2005, Woolworths acquired 23 demerged Foodland Action supermarkets. In the 
same year, a joint venture between Woolworths and hotel operator Bruce Mathieson 
purchased the Australian Leisure and Hospitality Group (ALH). Later that year, ALH 
expanded its portfolio to 250 hotels by acquiring the Taverner Hotel Group and the 
Bruce Mathieson Group.  
 
Preceding the acquisition of the Coles Group, Wesfarmers’ expansion was also 
spurred on by an agenda of acquisitions including, but not limited to, CSBP (a 
manufacturer and supplier of chemicals), Western Collieries, Bengalla Deposit, MDL 
and Curragh mining operations, Dalgety and IAMA rural merchandise wholesaler and 
retailers, Bunnings Warehouse and Howard Smith hardware networks, Australian 
Railroad Group freight operator, Lumley Finance Australia and New Zealand, 
OAMPS Insurance Brokers, Coregas, Australian Vinyls and Greencap Limited. 
 
In 2010 to 2011, the Australian grocery industry was worth $130.6 billion, accounting 
for around 10% of the Australian economy. With a population of 23.9 million,38 
Australia is significantly smaller in size than the United States (US) and United 
Kingdom (UK), yet has more supermarkets per capita than the US and nearly three 
times as many as the UK.39 
 
As at 2015, the Australian grocery retailing industry is accurately and unanimously 
described as a duopoly. It is dominated by two large vertically integrated retailers, 
each with significant economic influence and market power – Coles (now part of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  OECD (2017), OECD Economic Surveys: Australia 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-aus-2017-en>.	  
39Stuart Alexander Website Development Link Digital, Australian Market – Stuart Alexander & Co: 
Premium FMCG Specialist Marketers, Distributors And Importers (2015) Stuartalexander.com.au 
<http://www.stuartalexander.com.au/aust_grocery_market_woolworths_coles_wholesale.php>. 
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Wesfarmers Limited) and Woolworths Limited possess 30.9% and 36.8% market 
share respectively.40 Woolworths Limited and Wesfarmers Limited were ranked the 
18th and 22nd largest retailers in the world respectively by Deloitte’s Global Powers of 
Retailing 2013 report.41 These two companies take in 40 cents in every retail dollar 
spent in Australia.42  
 
By total revenue, Woolworths is ranked number 2 of the top 2000 companies in 
Australia. In 2017, the company generated total revenue of $55 billion, including 
sales and other revenue. In 2017, Woolworths had 202,000 employees in Australia, 
including employees from all subsidiaries under the company’s control.43 
 
Wesfarmers Limited is one of Australia’s largest diversified companies. Wesfarmers’ 
industry specific revenue is expected to be $31.2 billion dollars in 2017/18.44  
 
This high level of retail concentration is unprecedented. As stated above, a significant 
contributing factor has been the number of creeping acquisitions that, little by little, 
have augmented the retail dominance of the two chains.  
 
The Report by the Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector titled Fair Market 
or Market Failure? A Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector (1999) (Baird Report) 
was the first contemporary review to identify the significant role that creeping 
acquisitions played in the rise to dominance of the major supermarket chains. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Cloutman, above n 17. 
41 Deloitte, Global Powers of Retailing 2015 (2015) 2 
<http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/au/Documents/consumer-business/deloitte-au-cb-
gpor-120115.pdf>. 
42 National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia Pty Ltd, above n 37, 2. 
43 IBIS World, Woolworths Ltd, Company Premium Report (2017). 
44 Cloutman, above n 17. 
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However, as early as 1936, the Industrial Commission of New South Wales was 
directed to inquire into and report on the management, control and operations of chain 
stores in that State. The terms of reference focused on the effects of the chain stores, 
which included Coles and Woolworths, on other parties, including producers, 
wholesalers, storekeepers and consumers, and whether there was any evidence of 
unfair competitive practices or undue restraints of trade.45  
 
Since that time, Australia has experienced a half-century of food retail development 
culminating in significant market concentration. Current day concerns have been 
taken up by the major political parties, particularly during the 1998 election 
campaign, with a commitment by the Coalition party to set up an enquiry into retail 
domination as soon as possible after the election.46 Since that time, a myriad of 
Government reports focused on corporate behaviour in the grocery sector.  
 
The majority of submissions to the Trade Practices Act Review Committee – Review 
of the Competition Law Provisions of the Trade Practices Act in 2003 (Dawson 
Review)47 made reference to the retail grocery market as a prime example of creeping 
acquisitions which may ultimately result in the significant lessening of competition.48  
 
On 5 August 2008, the Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and 
Consumer Affairs, the Hon Chris Bowen MP, released the Government’s preliminary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Baird Report, above n 3, 3. 
46 Ibid, 1. 
47	  Trade Practices Act Review Committee, Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Competition 
Law Provisions of the Trade Practices Act (2003) (‘The Dawson Review’).	  
48 Julie Clarke, Submission to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and Treasury, 
Creeping Acquisitions, Discussion Paper 1, 2011, 2. 
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action plan in response to the Grocery Inquiry.49 This was the original call for tangible 
legislative reform to address creeping acquisitions. The ACCC stated that the 
particular structural features of the supermarket industry meant that acquisitions by 
Coles and Woolworths of small independent supermarkets were a potential 
competitive concern and those acquisitions were unlikely to be prohibited by current 
legislative provisions.   
 
The Grocery Inquiry also reported the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)50 for the 
retailing of packaged groceries to be between 2750 and 3000.51 By comparison, the 
Merger Guidelines state that the ACCC considers markets to be concentrated for the 
purposes of notification when a small number of firms accounts for a large proportion 
of sales, output or capacity, giving a HHI of greater than 2000. Therefore, according 
to the ACCC’s own definition, the market for packaged groceries is concentrated – to 
a level that requires action on the part of the regulator.  
 
The Australian Airports Association, NRMA, Retail Guild of Australia, Council of 
Small Business Australia, Friends of Hawker Village, Metcash and Australian United 
Retailers Limited trading as Foodworks have all called for changes to address 
creeping acquisitions.52  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Bowen, above n 1, 1. 
50 As discussed in Chapter Three, the HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It 
is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a market, and then summing the 
resulting numbers, and can range from close to zero to 10,000.  
51 National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia Pty Ltd, above n 37, 5. 
52 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Report on Competition Policy Review’ (2015) 265 (Harper Report). 
22	  
	  
B The Materialisation of Harm  
 
After a string of acquisitions and expansions, it is clear that Woolworths and Coles 
dominate the Australian supermarket retail sector. Coles/Wesfarmers and Woolworths 
have utilised their position to expand into a vast range of Australian industries, 
including but not limited to insurance, petrol, liquor, clothing, data companies, office 
supplies, hotels, gaming, mining and hardware, with pressure to move directly into 
pharmacy operations to compete with legislatively-protected specialised 
pharmacy/chemist stores. Peter McDonald, Marketing Lecturer at Sydney University 
commented: 
It’s an anomaly worldwide to have … two owners dominating so many different sectors.53 
 
Consumers, as well as retail competitors, suppliers, wholesalers, producers and 
manufacturers have all felt the impact of this. They require a pro-competitive 
environment that in the longer term encourages investment and innovation, choice, 
variety, value and responsiveness. Benefit means a lot more than just short-term low 
prices and forward looking regulation must be adopted to ensure consumers will not 
be worse off in the end.  
 
1 The Impact on Consumers – Reduced Variety, Quality and Service 
 
The following discussion identifies areas where consumers could legitimately claim 
that the Coles/Woolworths duopoly has resulted in them being worse off. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Sarah Whyte, Pharmacies Next Target Of Big Two, Say Analysts (2013) The Sydney Morning 
Herald <http://www.smh.com.au/data-point/pharmacies-next-target-of-big-two-say-analysts-2013092 
7-2ujm0.html>. 
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Part of consumer welfare involves consumers having a variety of goods and services 
to choose from. As discussed below, Coles and Woolworths have utilized their 
position as vertically integrated suppliers and retailers with significant market power 
to reduce or eliminate many branded products in favour of their own multi-tiered 
private label products. The lack of competition in the retail market makes it difficult 
for consumers to purchase those branded goods elsewhere, resulting in an overall 
reduction in variety available to consumers. 
 
According to the Australian Food Grocery Council cited in the KPMG Report – 
Competitiveness & Sustainable Growth54 (KPMG Report), the number of branded 
SKUs deleted in FY13 was the highest in the previous four years, while the number of 
private label SKUs deleted that year was the lowest. In the same year, 88 new private 
label products and 1048 new branded products were introduced. In comparison, 211 
private label products and 1743 branded label products were deleted. That is, there 
was a net reduction in variety. Retail data suggests that the share of the AU$1.6 
billion bread market held by private label products grew from 11% to 19% from 2008 
to 2009 while the share held by major manufacturer Goodman Fielder fell from 42% 
to 34.5% over the same period.55  
 
Market research organisation Roy Morgan Research found that only 52 per cent and 
56 per cent of customers who shop at Coles and Woolworths respectively say their 
supermarket stocks the brands they want, and these numbers have been declining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Australian Food and Grocery Council, ‘Competitiveness & Sustainable Growth’ (June 2014). 
55 Stiegart and Kim, above n 35, 25. 
24	  
	  
since a peak in 2011.56 Forty-eight per cent of IGA’s customers said they could find 
the brands they want, while only 29 per cent of ALDI shoppers expressed the same. 
General Manager of Consumer Products at Roy Morgan Research, Geoffrey Smith 
commented: 
 
[O]ver the last few years, an increasing number of well-known brands have been replaced on 
supermarket shelves with stores’ own home brands – and it appears shoppers are noticing the 
absence.57 
 
CHOICE surveyed members regarding the prevalence of their favourite brands. The 
response was described as overwhelming with comments such as: 
 
‘More and more I find I have to drive around town to get the products I’m looking for.’ 58  
 
‘I’m sick of having to chase my favourite products down.’59 
 
‘Pretty much everything I used to buy is getting less shelf space, only to be replaced with the 
three varieties of shop brand.’60 
 
The issue is not the disappearance of brands per se because in a competitive market 
weaker competitors will be eliminated. Rather, it is the disappearance of brands that 
are otherwise popular with consumers, due to the vertically integrated 
Coles/Woolworths duopoly either failing to stock those brands, failing to stock those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Sophie Langley, ‘Australian Supermarket Consumers Miss Branded Food Products’, Australian 
Food News (5 August 2013) <http://ausfoodnews.com.au/2013/08/05/australian-supermarket-
consumers-miss-branded-food-products.html>.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Elise Dalley and Zoya Sheftalovich, ‘The Situation on the Supermarket Shelves’ CHOICE, 11 
September 2014. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
25	  
	  
brands in sufficient quantities to make them viable, failing to display those brands in 
ways that enable them to compete or purchasing those brands at prices that are 
unsustainable for the suppliers. 
 
For example, an article by CHOICE – a leading independent consumer advocate that 
provides Australians with information and advice, free from commercial bias – 
reported on the managing director of a company who cited an experience with Coles 
where Coles refused him any shelf space, would only stock his product behind 
obstructions and denied him the use of promotions in store and in their catalogue. ‘It 
made it impossible for us to compete.’ Eventually his product was deleted due to lack 
of sales. He commented: 
 
‘We suspect what they were really doing was targeting products they wanted to delete so that 
it would be easier to justify in six to eight month time.’61  
 
Tim Morris, managing director of New Zealand strategic management consulting and 
market research firm Coriolis Research commented: 
 
At the end of the day, the retailer owns the store and can do whatever they want. They can put 
rival products on the bottom of the shelf, and their own products at eye level. They can 
manipulate the price. The only controls are competition and the consumer.62 
 
Another report by CHOICE told of Mark* (*name changed) who had his organic 
product deleted directly after Woolworths acquired the Macro wholefoods label. 
Following steady sales for three years, Woolworths’ category buyer told him there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Dalley and Sheftalovich, above n 58. 
62 Ibid. 
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was only room for one organic label – Macro, its own.63 Products that do not 
maximise profits fall by the wayside. A very popular item with low margins is not 
worth the shelf space.  
 
Another example is the bankruptcy of wholly Australian-owned cannery, Windsor 
Farm Foods, who packed for Edgell, Cowra Gold and Lachlan Gold.64 It has been 
alleged that part of the reason was the pressure which Coles and Woolworths placed 
on growers and food manufacturers.65 
 
There are other examples.  In 2011, Woolworths replaced the entire range of Allsep’s 
bagged lollies with Chinese imports, thus replacing a brand serving Australian 
generations since 1934.66 In January 2012, Heinz Australia closed its tomato sauce 
factory in Gigarre, Victoria. Heinz’s Golden Circle beetroot and fruit processing 
facility in Queensland’s Lockyer Valley shared a similar fate as its business was 
partly shifted from Australia and New Zealand.67 Factories in Northgate, Brisbane, 
Wagga Wagga and New South Wales have undergone downsizing.68 ‘Greenseas’, one 
of Heinz’s popular brands, reported significant deletions in lieu of Coles’ private label 
brand.69  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid. 
64 Sophie Langley, ‘Last Australian Food Cannery Turns off the Light’, Australian Food News (14 
August 2013) <http://ausfoodnews.com.au/2013/03/14/last-australian-food-cannery-turns-off-the-
light.html>. 
65 Ibid.	  
66 Stuart Washington, ‘Consumers May be Winning but at a Hefty Cost to the Food Industry’ The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 26 November 2011.  
67 Langley, above n 64. 
68 Matt Paish, ‘AFGC Renews Calls for Government Action on Factory Closures’, Australian Food 
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Gourmet Food Holdings, which owns the iconic brands Rosella and Aristocrat, as 
well as Galiko, the Curry Makers, Blue Banner Onions, Artisano, Waterthins, 
Waterwheel, and Stromboli branded condiments, was unable to cope with strategies 
adopted by Coles and Woolworth and was placed in liquidation in 2012.70  
 
For a succession of years, Coca-Cola Amatil, has carried the losses of its subsidiary 
SPC Ardmona (SPCA), the last remaining fruit processor in Australia. In 2013, 
significant workforce restructuring and downsizing was made by the management in 
an effort to maximise efficiency and save the industry. This included SPCA’s cannery 
operations in Victoria’s Goulburn Valley and Murray Valley.71 Although SPCA 
secured a $70 million supply deal with Woolworths, it is reported that that deal will 
only allow SPCA to break even. A step in the right direction from the previous deal, 
that saw SPCA run at a 30 per cent loss.72  
 
In 2016, IBISWorld reported that approximately one in three products on supermarket 
shelves were private label73 and it is predicted that the private label products’ global 
market share will double to 50 per cent by 2025.74 
 
In the cases where entire brands have collapsed, consumers are also no longer able to 
source these brands from independent or rival retailers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ferrierhodgson.com, The Gourmet Group (2015) 
<http://www.ferrierhodgson.com/au/administrations/the-gourmet-group>. 
71 Sharman Stone, ‘Hon Dr Sharman Stone Speech’ (Media Release, 6 May 2014) 
<http://spcardmona.com.au/en/media-room/media-
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72 Jared Lynch, ‘Growers Welcome $70m Woolworths Deal with SPC’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 11 March 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/business/growers-welcome-70m-woolworths-deal-
with-spc-20140311-34k0d.html>.  
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In addition to variety, consumer welfare also requires quality goods and services. 
However, in 2014, Mr Simms, Chairman of the ACCC, noted examples of a decline 
in quality of products due to the private label market. In an article published in the 
Financial Review, Mr Sims said: 
 
Major retailers are sourcing private label and branded products more cheaply from overseas 
by cutting out "middleman" distributors and agents. They do not have proper systems and 
processes in place to ensure that the products they import comply with Australian safety 
standards.75 
 
These comments followed legal action led by the ACCC against Woolworths for 
selling faulty products such as deep fryers, drain cleaners, folding stools and safety 
matches.76  
 
Ironically, competitors of Coles and Woolworths such as ALDI and Costco compete 
on price, resulting in necessary reductions in product variety and quality of service. 
ALDI operates on a discount supermarket format with limited product assortment77 
and service. Ninety per cent of its products are private label brands delivered to stores 
via one of ALDI’s centralised distribution centres.78  
 
While this limited range is advertised by ALDI as a benefit to consumers – being a 
carefully selected range of which there are few alternatives of the same product, 
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September 2014. 
76 Ibid. 
77 900 products. 
78 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the 
Competitiveness of Retail Prices for Standard Groceries (2008) 43 (‘Grocery Inquiry’). 
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designed to match the needs of a price conscious consumer,79 the real benefit 
achieved is the ability for ALDI to operate out of smaller stores80 – reducing 
overheads such as rent, utilities and payroll.81 To further reduce costs and keep prices 
low, ALDI does not undertake significant advertising and marketing campaigns. 
ALDI displays products on pallets or packaging boxes and its checkout system is 
designed to minimise both labour costs and queue times with customers having to 
pack their own groceries into either purchased or bought from home bags. Consumers 
effectively trade lower prices for reduced variety and reduced service. 
 
ALDI also sources many of its more affordable products abroad. In isolation, this is 
not an issue. However, it raises a concern as to whether there will be sufficient 
retailers of locally produced products in the long term for the Australian agricultural 
sector to remain viable. 
 
Similarly, Costco Wholesale Corporation operates an international chain of member’s 
only big-box discounter warehouses, under the ‘Costco Wholesale’ name. Costco 
introduced a new style of ‘big box’ retailing to Australia operating out of simple 
warehouses and stocking a wide range of products in sizeable quantities including 
grocery, jewelry, office supplies, homewares, sports, clothing, meats, bakery, fresh 
produce and dairy, to name a few. It also offers its own private label product line – 
Kirkland. Costco claims that the size and efficiency of these warehouses allow for 
lower costs than traditional retailers. However, Costco is not substitutable to a full 
service supermarket. Costco’s unique large format, with only 9 warehouse locations 
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81 ALDI, above n 79, 7. 
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Australia wide and bulk product range, is not accessible by or practical for the 
average Australian consumer. 
 
Furthermore, a PriceWaterhouseCoopers report on the state of the Australian grocery 
industry shows that despite controlling a staggering 80 per cent of the market share, 
Woolworths, Coles and ALDI only employ 43 per cent of all grocery employees. In 
contrast, independent retailers with a 20 per cent market share employ 57 per cent of 
our nation’s grocery staff.82 Keeping this in mind, a Network Economics Consulting 
Group report referred to in the Senate Committee’s report on The Effectiveness of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 in Protecting Small Business analysed the volume of 
business expected to be lost by Metcash (nearest competitor to the major supermarket 
chains) as a result of ‘an expected current round of creeping acquisitions involving 16 
stores’ as 1.77 per cent. It considered a range of scenarios relating to further losses in 
sales volume of up to 10 per cent as a result of possible future acquisitions.83 A loss of 
such volume compromises the sustainability of these independent retail outlets that 
employ so many Australians. Those very Australians are also the consumers whose 
welfare is paramount.  
 
2 The Impact on Competing Retailers – the Waterbed Effect and Predatory 
Pricing 
 
The market power of the major supermarket chains allows them to force down the 
price they pay suppliers – for example, processors for private label milk. On its own, 
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and Pricing in the Australian Dairy Industry (‘Milk Report’), 61. 
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this is no problem. However, the price paid by Coles and Woolworths to milk 
processors has reached an unsustainable level, leading to the processors charging a 
higher price on milk sold to other retailers to compensate.84 Independent retailers told 
the Senate Economics Reference Committee in the Report Milking it for all it’s Worth 
– Competition and Pricing in the Australian Dairy Industry (Milk Report) that this 
worked as follows: 
 
Independent retailers pay more than the contract price for house brand milk to Fonterra and to 
National Foods. They have to charge me more so that they can, at the end of the day, make 
money. I am, in effect, subsidising the supply of house brand milk to those people [major 
supermarket chains].85 
 
To express the point another way, there is a level of return that a milk processor 
requires. Therefore, the lower the prices paid by the major supermarket chains for 
private label milk, the higher the prices the milk processor will need to charge smaller 
retailers for branded milk to make up for the lower returns from Coles and 
Woolworths.86 
 
This is known as the ‘waterbed effect’. The ‘waterbed effect’ is the term used to 
describe the result when a large player in a market demands lower wholesale prices 
from suppliers, forcing those suppliers to increase prices to other customers – the 
other retailers in this case – to bring earnings back to a sustainable level.87  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Ibid, 27. 
85 Committee Hansard, 4 February 2010 (Mr Ken Henrick). 
86 Zumbo, above n 5, 9. 
87 Grocery Inquiry, above n 78, 353.  
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Australia is a market dominated by two fully vertically integrated retailers with high 
barriers to entry.  For small retailers to remain competitive they have had to band 
together under a banner group such as the case of Metcash Limited88 and IGA. 
 
A further practice is predatory capacity. Predatory capacity describes the situation 
where the major supermarket chains build an oversized supermarket in a town where 
there is no need for any new supermarket. The new supermarket runs at a loss up until 
the point where smaller local businesses’ loss of trade becomes too much for them 
and they close. The oversized retailer’s initial losses are funded by the profits earned 
in other unrelated markets and industries. A report by the Commonwealth Bank 
pointed out that Woolworths was accumulating around $1 billion worth of property 
per annum.89 Retail floor space is actually being built faster than population growth.90 
Of this, Wakefield Planning, a Melbourne based consultancy firm commented: 
 
Any future commercial development … needs to be completely justifiable on the basis of 
current population levels. Given that levels of growth are below the levels predicted for the 
initial planning period, floor space needs to not ‘lead demand’. This is because there is highly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Metcash, previously named Davids, is Australia’s largest wholesale distribution and marketing 
company specializing in independently owned grocery, fresh food, liquor, hardware, automotive parts 
and accessories. Metcash operates under three business pillars – Metcash Food & Grocery (MF&G), 
Australian Liquor Marketers (ALM) and Metcash Hardware & Automotive. 
Metcash uses a franchise model for its retail activities; these stores and hotels are outlets owned by 
independent retailers who draw on the full marketing, branding, logistical and distributional support of 
Metcash.  
MF&G is comprised of 2,400 independent stores across Australia including; 1,365 IGA branded stores, 
117 Foodland stores, 484 FoodWorks stores and 245 Lucky 7 convenience stores. The IGA network 
alone competes in a number of retail formats. Supa IGA and IGA Fresh stock a full range of products 
in larger format stores. IGA Stores are medium neighbourhood stores with a more limited range. IGA 
X-Press is the smaller convenience store format and IGA Liquor, a line of liquor stores across 
Australia.  
A large proportion of these independent retailers serviced by Metcash operate in rural or regional areas. 
Metcash does not operate in Tasmania; with the wholesaling function for independent retailers being 
undertaken there by Woolworths owned SIW. 
89 Commonwealth Bank, When Woolies Became an A-REIT, Global Markets Research: Equities, 
Woolworths Limited, 1 June 2012. 
90 Z Fielding, ‘Shop Space Grows Despite Slow Sales’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 11 
July 2012, 46. 
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limited ability for population growth to ‘take up’ floor space demand provided in advance of 
such growth. This again reinforces the importance of retail floor space trailing rather than 
leading population growth.91  
 
Bermagui, a small town with of 2,323 residents in south-east New South Wales 
provides an example of this practice.92 Woolworths Limited lodged a development 
proposal to build a 1,852 square metre Woolworths supermarket and a 152 square 
metre liquor store in Bermagui.93 At the time, the residents of Bermagui were already 
serviced by a 450 square metre FoodWorks, an IGA, a 777 store, a butcher, 
greengrocer, bakery, pharmacy and newsagent. Just 20 minutes away in both Bega 
and Narooma there was also a Coles and Woolworths supermarket. 
 
The Woolworth development application avoided considering whether an oversupply 
of retail space for the resident population would occur by citing a previous case 
involving a Woolworths’ subsidiary, Fabcot Pty Ltd. In Fabcot Pty Ltd v Hawkesbury 
City Council (97) LGERA, Justice Lloyd noted ‘economic competition between 
individual trade competitors is not an environmental or planning consideration to 
which the economic effect described in s 90(1)(d) is directed.’ 
 
The development application also contended that any detrimental effects would be 
outweighed by the greater competition, price, range and convenience provided by the 
proposed Woolworths supermarket development.94 Contrary to the representations in 
the development application, competition and product range have been reduced since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Wakefield Planning, Submission on DA 2012.0098: Proposed Woolworths Supermarket, Bermagui, 
June 2012, 5. 
92 ID, Population, Dwellings & Ethnicity | Bermagui Coast – Wapengo and District (2015) Profile.id 
Community Profile <http://profile.id.com.au/bega-valley/population?WebID=120>. 
93 Fabcot Pty Ltd, submission on DA 2013.405: Proposed Woolworths Supermarket – Montague Street, 
Young street and Unnamed Laneway, Bermagui, 26 March 2014. 
94 Ibid. 
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Woolworths opened with both the Foodworks and IGA closing down, and the 777 
store reporting a 40 per cent downturn in profits.95  
 
The market power of the major supermarket chains allows for the cross subsidisation 
of unviable developments with their extensive network of stores including related 
retail, fuel, insurance, liquor and gambling enterprises. These initial losses are offset 
by their ability to drive out all competition and consequently not have to compete on 
price in the medium and long term. 
 
The problem with this behaviour is that it eliminates any chance that small or 
independent competitors may grow into businesses with economies of scale sizeable 
enough to enjoy a similar buying power and influence. As long as the major 
supermarket chains are able to employ strategies that keep the small retailers small or 
completely eliminate them from the market, a shift in the competitive structure will 
never be seen. 
 
While these practices may in fact be a breach of the market power provisions in 
ss 46(1) and 46(1AA) of the CCA, establishing a breach is problematic. The initial 
symptoms often appear pro-competitive and acquiring clear, cogent evidence of an 
anti-competitive purpose to uphold such an allegation is inherently difficult. 
 
To properly deal with these weaknesses, Australia requires a pro-active competition 
regime that guides and permits decision makers to consider the aggregation of 
previous piecemeal acquisitions from the outset. The objective of policy makers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Albery McKnight, ‘Bermagui Woolworths’ market share cutting main street profits ‘Bega District 
News, 20 July 2015.  
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should be to prevent damage from arising in the first instance, rather than seeking to 
unwind it through the market power provisions. These pro-active approaches are 
considered in detail in Chapter Five. 
 
3 The Impact on Farmers and Suppliers – Unsustainable Incomes 
 
Farmer organisations have expressed concern that the market power of the major 
supermarket chains has enabled them to drive aggressive bargains in the purchase of 
produce. Coles and Woolworths account for a very large part of most food 
processors’ businesses – up to 70% in some cases. Any loss of distribution to Coles 
and Woolworths would dramatically decrease the volume output through their 
factories, impacting on efficiency, economies of scale and overhead recovery.96 So 
farmer organisations have to accept the lower prices that Coles and Woolworths offer. 
The issue is whether these lower prices are sustainable for the suppliers. 
 
A KPMG Report found Coles had cut the prices of more than 6,000 grocery items by 
an average of 10 per cent since its ‘down’ campaign began in 2010. Woolworths did 
the same.97 Viewed in isolation, this is good for consumers. But the issue is whether 
this comes at the cost of the prices paid to suppliers being unsustainable. 
 
A further issue arises in relation to private label products. In many cases, the supplier 
and producer of a branded product is also the supplier and producer of the major 
supermarket chain’s private label product. To secure a contract with the major 
supermarket chains, processors are pressured to reduce prices for the supply of private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Stiegart and Hwan Kim, above n 35, 84. 
97 Interview with Hon Bruce Billson MP, Minister for Small Business (Radio Interview, 19 June 2014).  
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label products. If these reduced prices are unsustainable then the lost revenue must be 
recovered from the branded products produced by the processors, which makes the 
branded products less competitive. Take for example a firm such as Murray Goulburn 
– Murray Goulburn may lose its Devondale milk shelf space to the Coles private label 
milk product, both of which it supplies. Although on paper, Murray Goulburn is still 
supplying the same volume of milk, the less profitable private label milk sales are 
increased at the expense of the highly profitable branded Devondale sales. Volume 
remains steady but profits are decreasing to levels which might not be sustainable. 
 
Firms who accept these arrangements are effectively competing with themselves, 
cannibalising their own margins and reducing their long-term competitiveness. In 
2011, Coles announced a pricing strategy of $1 per litre for its home brand milk.98 
The milk would be used as a ‘loss leader’ product to encourage consumers into the 
store. Woolworths followed suit. Overnight, milk in Australia became cheaper than 
bottled water and soft drinks.99 The milk processors were told they would as a result 
be paid less and had no alternative but to pass that price cut on to the producer – a 
dairy farmer. The dairy farmers had no power to refuse supply to Coles and 
Woolworths and were forced to accept a price below the cost of production. This 
ability of the major supermarket chains to extract more advantageous trading terms 
from suppliers and access financial benefits at the beginning of the retail chain can 
never be recovered by a competitor. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Coles, ‘Because We All Buy Milk: Coles Cuts the Price to Help Shoppers Save’ (Media Release, 26 
January 2011).  
99 Australiancompetitionlaw.org, Australian Competition Law (2015) 
<http://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/reports/2011milk.html>. 
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An Inquiry by the Senate Committee in 2010 that resulted in the Milk Report was 
established to investigate a number of concerns with the pricing strategies 
implemented in the milk sector. The major supermarket chains’ use of certain pricing 
strategies in relation to home brand products was found to have unintended and anti-
competitive consequences. It was found that the major supermarket chains were 
making far more profit from the sale of milk than were the farmers.100 The Milk 
Report also reported that although the impetus of this report was the dairy industry, 
the issues were common to many other sectors of the economy where the retail 
market was also becoming increasingly dominated by private label products sold by 
the major supermarket chains. Processors were increasingly in the position of having 
to compete with their own branded goods.101  
 
The ACCC’s media release of 22 July 2011 stated that it considered there to be no 
evidence that Coles acted in breach of the CCA in relation to milk discounting. The 
ACCC revealed evidence that Coles’ purpose in reducing the price of its house milk 
was to increase its market share by taking sales from its competitor Woolworths. This 
is consistent with what the ACCC would expect to find in a competitive market.102 
The reality of the situation however was that Coles and Woolworths adopted the same 
strategies, resulting in no significant effect on market share or milk consumption but 
an unfavourable outcome for the milk production chain.103 
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101 Milk Report, above n 83, 7. 
102 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ‘Coles discounting of house Brand Milk is Not 
Predatory Pricing’ (Media release 22 July 2011). 
103 Roger Crook, ‘Do Coles and Woolworths Control Australian Agriculture?’ Global Farmer, (16 
August 2014). 
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For the major supermarket chains, private label goods are big profit drivers. 
Marketing them is cheap and manufacturing is streamlined. Lion Dairy & Drinks, 
which previously held private label contracts in most states with both Coles and 
Woolworths, stepped out of the bidding war based on the plain reasoning that ‘the 
extra volumes merely help recover fixed costs in processing plants. They are not 
profitable for the sake of putting volume through milk plants, but without such 
contracts more than half of the market is effectively closed to them.’104  
 
Furthermore, where suppliers provide both brand and private label business, the 
negotiation position of the supplier versus the food retailer is far from equal. The 
negotiation position of a supplier pivots on the information asymmetry regarding the 
supplier’s cost base, pricing structure and innovation pipeline. Through the private 
label supply, the supplier is disclosing most of its cost structure, undermining the 
market position of its brand and reinforcing the retailer’s negotiation power. By 
introducing a 1:1 copy of a branded product anywhere from 20 per cent to 60 per cent 
cheaper, the retailer can quite easily infer the mark-up attracted to a branded product 
and demand a larger share of the profit pool. The retailer is in the position to negotiate 
the purchase price of branded products more similar to the price charged for private 
label products. This indicates a shift in market power in the Australian food-value 
chain from producers and manufacturers to retailers.105  
 
The overarching concern here is the reduction in the return back down the value chain 
to processors and the farm gate. This redistribution of wealth along the supply chain is 
having detrimental effects on the Australian farming sector, particularly in country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Sue Mitchell, ‘Fonterra Inks Milk Deal With Woolworths’ The Financial Review, 3 April 2014. 
105 Stiegart and Kim, above n 35, 24-25.  
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and regional communities where most of the food factories are located. Society as a 
whole would be very much poorer if it did not have the diversity and opportunity that 
many competitors bring to the market.106 NARGA’s national spokesman, Mr Alan 
McKenzie commented: 
 
If the government fails to intervene, the market share of the independent retailers will 
continue to be eroded, to the point where the entire sector will be threatened with irreversible 
market failure due to the loss of critical mass. The consequences of such an outcome will be 
severe and, in particular, will bring great hardship to rural Australia. At 80 per cent of the 
retail grocery market, when do we say enough is enough?107 
 
Exacerbating the effects on every level is the extent of vertical integration of the 
major supermarket chains, often achieved through a strategy of creeping acquisitions. 
Vertical integration enables the major chains to derive their entire profitability from 
retail operations, while in the independent sector both the warehouse and the retail 
stores make separate profits. 
 
Vertical integration enables a firm with market power to increase monopoly profits 
through price discrimination. As Mason CJ and Wilson J observed in QCMA:  
 
... vertical integration may help a monopolist distinguish between customers whose demand is 
less and more elastic. Where consumers are able to trade amongst themselves, the monopolist 
cannot discriminate. By integrating vertically it may be possible for a monopolist to prevent 
this inter-trading. For example, power companies usually own distribution systems. This 
enables them to discriminate in pricing between residential and commercial users. Therefore, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Baird Report, above n 3, 138. 
107 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 12 July 1999, 1031 (Mr Alan Mackenzie). 
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although vertical integration does not by itself mean that a firm has a substantial degree of 
market power; it may well be the means by which the firm capitalises on that market power.108  
 
The push to vertical integration has the potential to put good firms out of business – 
with all the implications that brings for competition, consumer choice and our 
capabilities as a food exporting nation. For most grocery manufacturers, supermarkets 
are the main distribution channel to customers. That leaves many at the mercy of the 
big two – and reliant on the terms and conditions they choose to offer. 
 
Australia has already experienced the collapse of a number of large-scale 
manufacturers and a reduction in the number of independent supermarkets as 
customers of those manufacturers.109 Without a viable food-processing sector, 
Australia’s long term domestic agricultural and manufacturing industry is at stake. 
According to the Australian Food and Groceries Council in 2011 to 2012, 335 food-
processing businesses closed down in Australia or moved overseas.  The 
Parliamentary Report titled The Supermarket Revolution in Food110 published in 2011 
recorded that in the previous three months alone, there had been a number of 
announcements regarding the closing down of major food factories in regional areas 
and the movement of their operations overseas. The closure of a dairy factory, for 
example, means that farmers no longer have an outlet for their milk. This comes at a 
cost to many direct jobs, leading to dramatic economic flow-on effects for local 
communities. With the loss of a major industry, small regional areas die a slow death 
because of the inability to sustain social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, 
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(1999) 5.156 <https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/merger-guidelines>. 
109 Dalley and Sheftalovich, above n 58. 
110 Stiegart and Kim, above n 35. 
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banks, supermarkets, and so on.111 
 
The ability of the major supermarkets to impose such onerous terms on its suppliers 
distorts markets in ways that consumers don’t see and suppliers can’t effectively 
counter. The impact of these low prices is far beyond the supermarket shelves, and far 
beyond consumers’ wallets.112  
 
III CONCLUSION 
 
This case study provides an example of what other markets in Australia may look like 
if unregulated creeping acquisitions were to expand to other sectors.  
 
As discussed above, the major supermarkets have incrementally gained control of all 
levels of the supply chain so they now deal directly with suppliers or have entirely 
eradicated the need for suppliers. This translates to further commercial control and 
advantage over the independents that must source supply from wholesalers that are 
often owned by their major supermarket competitors. The ongoing viability of the 
independent network is dependent on their share of the market not shrinking to the 
stage where that wholesaling and distribution network becomes unviable. Mr John 
Hunter, General Counsel for Metcash Trading Ltd, summarised the situation as 
follows: 
 
[T]he cumulative impact of creeping acquisitions by the major chains in the retail grocery 
sector is anticompetitive. That is not only because the ‘ongoing duopolisation’ of the grocery 
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sector means that price competition offered by a ‘third full service player’ is at risk, but also 
because the competitive ability of wholesalers who supply independent grocery retailers is 
under threat.113 
 
Detriment has also materialised for consumers. A report prepared by the Network 
Economics Consulting Group on behalf of Metcash Trading Ltd and submitted to the 
2004 Senate Inquiry concluded:114  
 
If cost increases are not passed through to consumers, the viability of Metcash and/or its 
independent retailers will be threatened well before a ten per cent loss of volume is reached. 
With as little as a six per cent loss of volume, we estimate that Metcash would no longer be 
able to raise equity finance. Well before this, Metcash’s ability to provide retail support 
services would be squeezed, which would flow through to deteriorating customer service at 
the retail level.115 
 
The point of the above discussion of the supermarket sector is that merger laws need 
to operate in a way which prevents the loss of competition and resulting negative 
outcomes in the supermarket sector also arising in other markets. It is conceded that 
not all the increases in market power in the supermarket sector arose from creeping 
acquisitions. But they played a significant role. This article takes the position that 
creeping acquisitions could occur in other markets, given the oligopolistic nature of 
many Australian markets. The next Chapter will discuss why creeping acquisitions 
avoid the operation of s 50. The article will then discuss how this loophole could be 
closed.  
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CHAPTER THREE – HOW DO CREEPING ACQUISITIONS CURRENTLY AVOID 
REGULATION? 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The merger review process can be broken down into three distinct phases. First, the 
administrative processes of bringing a merger or acquisition under review; secondly, 
the process of analysing the likely competitive effects of that merger; and thirdly, the 
remedies and penalties for breach of the merger provisions.   
 
As Australia’s current competition law stands, there are severe remedies and penalties 
if s 50 is breached and the parties involved do not modify or withdraw the merger or 
acquisition. In these cases the ACCC may commence proceedings for pecuniary 
penalties,116 seek an injunction to prevent the merger or acquisition occurring,117 
apply for an order of divestiture requiring the disposal of shares or assets acquired 
from the merger,118 seek damages for loss as a result of the contravention,119 or accept 
undertakings to resolve matters without proceeding to litigation.120 Parties may also 
be liable for significant fines.121  
 
Where the merger provisions are deficient, however, is in the first two phases. While 
the remedies and penalties are there, the tools and guidelines to bring high-risk 
mergers to the attention of the ACCC and then establish a breach are not. The drafters 
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121 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 76. 
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of the Trade Practices (Creeping Acquisitions) Amendment Bill 2007 [2008] also 
regarded s 50 as inadequate in dealing with ‘acquisitions by stealth.’122 Broadly, the 
three main deficiencies include: 
 
1. There is no obligation to notify the ACCC of high-risk mergers; 
 
2. The counterfactual can only apply to a single merger and does not reflect 
commercial realities; and 
 
3. There is no express authority in the merger factors for the ACCC or the Courts 
to consider the cumulative effect of mergers and acquisitions. 
 
II NO OBLIGATION FOR PRE-MERGER NOTIFICATION 
 
Around the world,123 pre-merger notification is considered essential to allow 
governments either to stop anti-competitive mergers or to negotiate remedies with 
parties. Compulsory notification is enshrined in the ICN guidelines and most 
international jurisdictions have some form of compulsory notification regime.  
 
Despite this, there is currently no statutory pre-merger notification regime in Australia 
requiring parties to notify and seek approval from the ACCC before merging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices (Creeping Acquisitions) Amendment Bill 2007 [2008] 
(Cth) 3. 
123 These include but are not limited to, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, the Isle 
of Man, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, 
Uruguay and the US.   
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regardless of how high risk the merger may be.124 The current Merger Guidelines only 
urge firms to notify the ACCC when the merged firm will have a post-merger market 
share of greater than 20 per cent in the relevant market and the products of the merged 
firms are substitutes or complements. The traditional avenues where the ACCC may 
be notified of an acquisition early enough to intervene are purely voluntary. These 
avenues include: 
 
1. Assessment of the proposed acquisition on an informal basis; 
2. An application for formal clearance of a proposed merger;125 
3. Assessment of an application for authorisation of a merger, using a net public 
benefit test.126 
 
An informal clearance is essentially a statement by the ACCC that the merger would 
not be likely to raise competition concerns under s 50, and the ACCC does not intend 
to oppose the merger. Although this advice is not binding127 and the ACCC may still 
bring action against a merger,128 the advice that the ACCC will not oppose the merger 
means the parties can proceed with greater confidence that their conduct will not be 
challenged. 
 
Alternatively, merger parties can obtain statutory immunity from s 50 through formal 
clearance granted by the ACCC. Formal merger clearance confers legal protection to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, ‘Merger Guidelines’ 
(2008) 7.12 <https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Merger%20guidelines.pdf> 2.1-2.9. 
125 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Part VII, Division 3, Subdivision B. 
126 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Part VII, Division 3, Subdivision C. 
127 See, for example, Trade Practices Commission v Santos Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 382. 
128 Herbert Smith Freehills, Changes To Informal Merger Clearance Guidelines (2015) 
<http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/insights/legal-briefings/changes-to-informal-merger-clearance-
guidelines>. 
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the person to whom clearance is granted from the application of s 50. This means that 
neither the ACCC nor any other party may initiate action on the basis of an alleged 
contravention of s 50 so long as the merger takes place in accordance with the 
clearance.129 The ACCC’s decision must be based on a determination that the merger 
would not have the effect or be likely to have the effect of substantially lessening 
competition in any market. 
 
As a third option, under ss 88(9) and 90(9) of the CCA, if a merger is found to 
substantially lessen competition it may nevertheless proceed if the ACCC grants an 
authorisation on the grounds that the merger, while lessening competition, leads to 
public benefits that outweigh the likely anti-competitive detriments.130 This principle 
finds its grounding in the objectives of the CCA – ‘to enhance the welfare of 
Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provisions for 
consumer protection’.131 
 
There has been widespread criticism of the two formal processes132 and in practice the 
formal merger clearance process has never been used in Australia and the merger 
authorisation process has only been used three times.133  
 
In Canada, the Notifiable Transactions provisions in Part IX of the Competition Act134 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Merger Reviews (2015) 
<https://www.accc.gov.au/business/mergers/merger-reviews>. 
130 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 95AZH. 
131 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 2. 
132 Allens Linklaters, Competition, Consumer & Regulatory (2018) 
<https://www.allens.com.au/services/comp/harpmaj-mergers.htm>. 
133 AGL Energy Limited - ACT 1 of 2014, Sea Swift Pty Ltd - proposed acquisition to acquire assets 
associated with the Toll Marine Logistics business and Proposed merger of Tabcorp Holdings and Tatts 
Group cited on merger register.  
134	  Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34.	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require that parties notify the Competition Bureau of certain transactions when they 
are of a specific type, exceed certain thresholds and are not subject to any exemptions, 
regardless of their likely impact on competition.  
 
The Competition Bureau must be given advance notice of proposed transactions when 
the target entity’s assets in Canada or revenues from sales in or from Canada 
generated from those assets exceed $88 million, and when the combined Canadian 
assets or revenues of the parties and their respective affiliates in, from or into Canada 
exceed $400 million.135 Failure to notify is a criminal offence.136 
 
Similarly in the US, where applicable thresholds are met and the transaction is not 
otherwise exempt, notification is mandatory. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act) 
established the federal premerger notification program, which provides the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DoJ) with information 
about large mergers and acquisitions before they occur. The parties to certain 
proposed transactions must submit premerger notification to the FTC and DoJ. 
Premerger notification involves completing a HSR Form, also called a ‘Notification 
and Report Form for Certain Mergers and Acquisitions’, with information about each 
company’s business. The parties may not close their deal until the waiting period 
outlined in the HSR Act has passed, or the government has granted early termination 
of the waiting period.137 
 
For the HSR Act to apply to a particular transaction, it must satisfy three tests: the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34, ss109 and 110. 
136 Government of Canada, Reviewing Mergers (2018) 
<http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00114.html >. 
137 Federal Trade Commission, Premerger Notification Program (2018) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program>. 
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commerce test of Section 7A(a)(1) as well as the size of transaction test and the size 
of person test of Section 7A(a)(2). 
 
An acquisition will satisfy the commerce test if either of the parties to a transaction is 
engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce. The size of transaction 
test is met if, as a result of the transaction, the acquiring person will hold an aggregate 
amount of voting securities, non-corporate interests and assets of the acquired person 
valued at more than US$50 million. The size of person test is met if one of the parties 
has sales or assets of at least US$100 million and the other party has sales or assets of 
at least US$10 million.138 
 
A handful of countries such as Argentina, Indonesia, Japan and Russia also have post-
merger notification regimes. 139  
 
Failing to adhere to a regime of mandatory notification for mergers puts Australia out 
of line with international best practice.140 Australian competition would be better 
served by legislating for such a regime.  
 
III THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING A MERGER 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are regulated by the substantially lessening of competition 
test enshrined in s 50 of the CCA. Section 50(1) prohibits corporations from acquiring 
‘shares in the capital of a body corporate’ or ‘any assets of a person’ if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Federal Trade Commission, Premerger Notification Office, 
 To File or Not to File: When you Must File a Premerger Notification Report Form, 2. 
139 Lex Mundi, ‘Global Practice Guide: Pre-Merger Notification’ (2012). 
140 Clarke, above n 48, 2. 
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acquisitions ‘would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially 
lessening competition in any market’.   
 
In Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd,141 Smithers J 
summarised the elements required by the substantial lessening of competition test: 
 
To apply the concept of substantially lessening competition in a market, it is necessary to 
assess the nature and extent of the market, the probable nature and extent of competition 
which would exist therein but for the conduct in question, the way the market operates and the 
nature and extent of the contemplated lessening. To my mind one must look at the relevant 
significant portion of the market, ask oneself how and to what extent there would have been 
competition therein but for the conduct, assess what is left and determine whether what has 
been lost in relation to what would have been, is seen to be a substantial lessening of 
competition.142 
 
The elements of the test are therefore: was there an acquisition; what is the extent of 
concentration in the relevant market; and has there been a substantial lessening of 
competition in that market? Appendix 1 provides this diagrammatically. 
 
These elements will be discussed below. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 (1982) 44 ALR 173. 
142 Ibid, 173. 
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A Merger or Acquisition 
 
Merger and acquisition are not terms defined in the CCA. In Australia, the term 
merger is a commercial concept rather than a legal one.143 The 2017 Media Merger 
Guidelines authored by the ACCC note as to terminology that s 50 mergers are those 
transactions where typically the shareholders of two companies (the merger parties) 
become the shareholders of the new merged company.144 An example is the 1985 
merger of Coles Variety Stores and Myer Emporium Ltd to form the new entity Coles 
Myer Ltd.145   
 
Acquisitions on the other hand are those transactions where a company (the acquirer) 
acquires the shareholding or assets of another company or person (the target).146 From 
this transaction no new entity is formed. One entity expands its scope and size while 
the other entity is either reduced or eliminated entirely. An example is Wesfarmers’ 
acquisition of the Coles Group147 in 2007.148 As a result, all Coles Group activity 
became wholly owned and controlled by Wesfarmers. Its shares were suspended from 
trading on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and the Coles Group ceased to 
exist.149  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Allens Linklaters, ‘The Allens Handbook on Takeovers in Australia’ (2017) 11 < 
https://www.allens.com.au/pubs/pdf/ma/takeovers-handbook.pdf>. 
144 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, ‘Media Merger 
Guidelines’ (2007). 
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Media%20Merger%20Guidelines%202017_0.pdf>. 
145 Deloitte Access Economics, ‘Analysis Of The Grocery Industry’ (2012) 3 
<http://www.academia.edu/7969473/Analysis_of_the_grocery_industry>. 
146 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 144. 
147 No longer Coles Myer Ltd as Coles and Myer demerged in 2005. 
148 Deloitte Access Economics, above n 145, 3. 
149 Wesfarmers Limited, Wesfarmers – Corporate Transactions (2015) 
<https://www.wesfarmers.com.au/investors/shareholder-information/corporate-transactions.html>. 
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The occurrence of a merger or acquisition as per these definitions satisfies the first 
element.  
 
B The Extent of Concentration in the Relevant Market 
 
This element requires two steps – first, what is the defined market affected by the 
merger or acquisition, and secondly, is there an absence or presence of concentration 
in that defined market? 
 
The first step, market definition, establishes the broad ‘field of inquiry’ relevant to the 
ACCC’s consideration of the acquisition. It identifies the areas of competition that 
may be affected by the proposed acquisition. When determining the limits of the 
relevant market, the Australian Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) and the courts must 
consider all influential factors – product substitutability,150 geographical constraints 
on supply and demand, function151 and temporal dimensions of the market.152 The 
market when used in the context of s 50 can include multiple geographical markets 
for goods or services in Australia, including state, territory, regional or local 
markets.153 This may also include upstream and downstream markets.154  
 
For the purposes of the CCA, s 4E defines the market as ‘a market in Australia and, 
when used in relation to goods or services, includes a market for those goods or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 This process of defining a market by substitution involves both including products which compete 
with the defendant’s and excluding those which because of differentiating characteristics do not 
compete. Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v BHP Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 577. 
151 That is, whether the focus is to be on the selling function or the buying function. 
152 That is, how much time is needed for customers and suppliers to make their adjustments in response 
to economic incentives? 
153 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 50(6). 
154 Explanatory Memorandum, Competition and Consumer Legislation Amendment Bill 2011 (Cth) 
1.6. 
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services and other goods or services that are substitutable for, or otherwise 
competitive with, the first-mentioned goods or services.’155  
 
The Tribunal in Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance 
Holdings Ltd156 (QCMA) elaborated upon this to also capture the network of actual 
and potential transactions between buyers and sellers of goods and services that are, 
or could be, in close competition.157  
 
A market is an area of close competition between firms or, putting it a little differently, the 
field of rivalry between them… Within the bounds of the market there is substitution between 
one product and another, and between one source of supply and another, in response to 
changing prices. So a market is a field of actual and potential transactions between buyers and 
sellers amongst whom there can be strong substitution, at least in the long run, if given 
sufficient price incentive… Whether such substitution is feasible or likely depends ultimately 
on customer attitudes, technology, distance and cost and price incentives… In determining the 
outer boundaries of the market we ask a quite simple but fundamental question: If the firm 
were to ‘give less and charge more’ would there be, to put the matter colloquially, much of a 
reaction? (emphasis in original).158 
 
Without an accurately defined market, competitors cannot be clearly identified, as 
was articulated by Mason CJ and Wilson J: 
 
too narrow a description of the market may exclude legitimate competitors, creating the 
appearance of more market power than in fact exists; too broad a description may erroneously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 4E. 
156 (1976) 8 ALR 481. 
157 Maureen Brunt, Economic Essays on Australian and New Zealand Competition Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 2003) 14. 
158 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 8 ALR 
481, 517. 
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classify certain non-rivals as competitors, creating the appearance of less market power than 
there actually is.159  
 
The case of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Metcash Trading 
Limited160 exemplifies this. In that case, Emmett J did not accept the ACCC’s market 
definition and the Commission’s case failed on that basis.161   
  
The ACCC relied primarily on economic theories, namely the theory of coordinated 
effects, in support of its preferred market definition.162 The ACCC alleged that the 
acquisition would substantially lessen competition in the independent wholesale 
grocery market for ‘packaged groceries’. The Commission based its case on there 
being a separate market for the wholesale supply of packaged groceries. This was 
limited to branded and generic items, such as breakfast cereal, canned food, biscuits, 
flour, tea, coffee, soft drinks, nappies, cleaning products, personal hygiene products 
and frozen food, but not including fresh items such as fresh fruit and vegetables, meat, 
delicatessen items and bakery items.163 
 
On appeal, the Full Court soundly rejected this theoretical approach, in line with 
earlier decisions criticising arguments based primarily on economic theory.164 The 
Court found no such separation, and defined the market more broadly as a national 
market for the supply of packaged groceries as well as fresh products, general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v BHP Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 577. 
160 [2011] FCA 967 (25 August 2011); [2011] FCAFC 151 (30 November 2011). 
161 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Metcash Trading Limited [2011] FCA 967 
(25 August 2011); [2011] FCAFC 151 (30 November 2011) 337. 
162 Jack Wright Nelson, ‘The ACCC Merger Guidelines 2008: Some Concerns and Recommendations’ 
(2012) 14 the University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review, 85. 
163 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Metcash Trading Limited [2011] FCA 967 
(25 August 2011); [2011] FCAFC 151 (30 November 2011), 182. 
164 See Australian Gas Light Company v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 
137 FCR 317, 416. 
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merchandise, health, beauty and cosmetic products to the consuming public.165 By the 
Court defining the market by reference to a broader range of products, the post-
merger market concentration the ACCC built its case upon would not have occurred.   
 
To apply the QCMA analysis above, the Court in Metcash found the rivalry between 
the major supermarket chains (Coles and Woolworths) and independent retailers was 
such that there was a very significant constraint on the capacity of Metcash to 
increase price or decrease service without the likely loss of business. The Court found 
that, even post-merger, should Metcash give less and charge more, there would be a 
significant reaction from consumers to the benefit of Metcash’s competitors. To this 
Emmett J commented:  
 
I am not persuaded that an increase of between five and ten per cent in the price at which 
goods are supplied by Metcash to independent retailers could be sustained without a resultant 
significant loss of business. 
 
Once the relevant market is defined, a conclusion about the presence or absence of 
market power, and whether the merger or acquisition ought to proceed, will follow.166  
The Merger Guidelines published in 1996 introduced an administrative safe harbour 
and the CR4 concentration ratio as tools to measure market concentration. Safe 
harbours are a practical tool used widely used by administrators of the law to specify 
certain conduct that will be deemed not to violate a given rule. The safe harbour and 
the CR4 approach stipulated that for a merger that will result in a post-merger 
combined market share of the four (or fewer) largest firms (CR4) of 75 per cent or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Metcash Trading Limited [2011] [2011] FCA 
967 (25 August 2011); [2011] FCAFC 151 (30 November 2011), 341-342. 
166 Stephen Corones, Competition Law and Policy in Australia (Lawbook, 1990) 58. 
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more and the merged firm will supply at least 15 per cent of the relevant market, the 
Commission will need to give close consideration to other merger factors to 
determine whether or not the merger is likely to result in a substantial lessening of 
competition. 167    
 
Certain shortfalls were acknowledged with this formulation. The 2008 Revised 
Merger Guidelines replaced the 1999 articulation.168 The revised Merger Guidelines 
introduced the HHI, which is still current. The HHI, which is also used by the US DoJ 
Antitrust Division, takes into account the relative size distribution of the firms in a 
market. It approaches zero when a market is occupied by a large number of firms of 
relatively equal size and reaches its maximum of 10,000 points when a market is 
controlled by a single firm. The HHI increases both as the number of firms in the 
market decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms increases.169 
 
The HHI captures the number of firms and the dispersion of the market shares by 
taking into account the pre- and post-merger market shares of the merged firms, the 
level of symmetry between rival firms’ market shares and the actual increase in 
concentration.170 The HHI is calculated by adding the sum of the square of both pre- 
and post-merger market shares of the merged firms and each rival in the relevant 
market.171 The ACCC will be less likely to identify concerns when the post-merger 
HHI is: 
Ø Less than 2000; or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, above n 108, 5.103. 
168 Alex Bruce, Restrictive Trade Practices Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 187. 
169 The United States Department of Justice, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (29 July 2015) 
<https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index>. 
170 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, above n 124. 
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Ø Greater than 2000 with a delta172 less than 100.173 
 
For example, if the market is composed of five firms: A, B, C, D and E, with market 
shares of 12%, 15%, 18%, 25% and 30% respectively, then the pre-merger HHI value 
is 2218: 
 
12² + 15² + 18² + 25² + 30² = 2218 
 
Post-merger, the market is composed of four firms as B and C merged, so the market 
shares are now 12%, 33%, 25% and 30% respectively. The post-merger HHI value is 
2758: 
 
12² + 33² + 25² + 30² = 2758 
 
The delta, or change from the pre-HHI value to the post-HHI value, is 540: 
  
2758 – 2218 = 540 
 
In this circumstance, the merger would invite close scrutiny by the ACCC as the HHI 
is greater than 2000 and the delta is greater than 100.  
 
It is important to note that the HHI threshold is a screening device for identifying 
merger and acquisitions that may require closer scrutiny. HHI values above the 
threshold do not determine that a merger will result in a substantial lessening of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 The delta reflects the changes in market concentration as a result of the merger. 
173 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, above n 124, 7.14.  
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competition. Likewise, a merger falling below the HHI threshold may still raise 
competition concerns.  
 
For that reason, the next step is to consider further merger factors as part of the 
overall assessment of whether a merger or acquisition is likely to substantially lessen 
competition. These factors are codified in s 50(3) of the CCA and are discussed 
below. 
 
C The Substantial Lessening of Competition Test, the Counterfactual and the 
Merger Factors 
 
Substantial is an important concept in competition and consumer law. It arises in a 
number of provisions, yet there has been little judicial guidance. ‘Substantial’ has 
been defined in case law as large, weighty, big, real or of substance or not 
insubstantial. However it is not straightforward; the meaning of substantial depends 
on the context and is used in a relative sense. 
 
In Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority [2000]174 French J said 
that to work out whether competition is being substantially lessened  
 
‘...there [must] be a purpose, effect or likely effect of the impugned conduct on competition 
which is substantial in the sense of meaningful or relevant to the competitive process.’  
 
The application of the substantial lessening of competition test involves a comparison 
of the competitive situation with the merger against the competitive situation without 
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the merger. The latter is called the ‘counterfactual’. The counterfactual is an 
analytical tool used in answering the question of whether the merger gives rise to a 
substantial lessening of competition.175 The description of the counterfactual is 
affected by the extent to which events or circumstances and their consequences are 
foreseeable, enabling the Commission or the Court to predict with some confidence 
what the outcome of a merger and acquisition would be on the market. 
 
At trial in the case of Metcash,176 Emmett J considered that it was necessary for the 
ACCC to establish ‘on the balance of probabilities’ what the ‘future state of the 
market will be, both with and without the proposed acquisition’.177 The without test 
predicts what the future state of the market will be should the proposed merger not 
occur. It deliberates on the potential changes in the market and compares this 
‘hypothetical market’ to the present state of the market. Should the future market with 
the merger stifle competition, the acquiring firm may be prohibited from proceeding 
with that transaction.178 However, should the future market with the merger or 
acquisition maintain or encourage competition that would otherwise not occur, the 
transaction is likely to be permitted to proceed. 
 
In considering the future, assumptions are made about what is likely to happen. An 
analysis of s 50 does not encompass ‘mere possibility’ but requires assessment ‘at a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Metcash Trading Ltd [2011] FCA 967 (25 
August 2011); [2011] FCAFC 151 (30 November 2011), [130]. 
176 Ibid, [130]. 
177 Ibid, [45]. 
178 Ibid, [135-136]. 
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level that is commercially relevant or meaningful’.179  Given the penalties that apply 
for a breach of s 50, this prediction must be more than hypothesis or conjecture.180 
 
The Federal Court’s 2011 decisions in Metcash181 and Australian Gas Light Co v 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 3)182 (AGL Case) addressed 
the necessary level of proof required to demonstrate that a proposed merger would 
substantially lessen competition. The Court approached the assessment in two stages: 
 
(a) The counterfactual must be proved on the balance of probabilities so that it is 
more probable than not that the proposed counterfactual will come to pass if 
the acquisition does not proceed. 
 
(b) There must be a ‘real chance’ that the effect or likely effect of the acquisition 
will result in a substantial lessening of competition. That is, there must be a real 
chance that if the proposed acquisition does proceed, that would result in a 
substantial lessening of competition compared to the scenario in which a 
competing counterfactual comes to pass.183 
 
In determining whether a substantial lessening of competition is likely to occur for the 
counterfactual analysis the court and ACCC may consider the merger factors 
enshrined in s 50(3) of the CCA. They outline the analytical and evaluative 
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180 Ibid, [88]. 
181 Ibid. 
182 (2003) 137 FCR 317. 
183 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Metcash Trading Ltd [2011] FCA 967 (25 
August 2011); [2011] FCAFC 151 (30 November 2011), [146]. 
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framework that the ACCC applies when reviewing mergers under s 50.184 The nine 
merger factors are a non-exhaustive list of factors principally designed to guide the 
courts and the ACCC on the possible effect on competition of a given merger. The 
factors include: 
 
1  The actual and potential level of import competition in the market 
 
Import competition refers to the level of actual or potential direct competition from 
strongly substitutable imported goods or services in the relevant market. The extent to 
which the merging firms are constrained by this is an effective check on market 
power. Former Chairman of the ACCC, Allan Fels commented: 
 
Potential, or real, import competition is considered an important factor because of the 
globalisation of markets. If import competition is an effective check on the exercise of market 
power, it is unlikely the Commission will intervene in a merger.185 
 
There is no judicial interpretation of the requisite level of import competition to deem 
no substantial lessening of competition; however the ACCC has indicated that it will 
not oppose mergers in markets where the market share of imports has been more than 
10% for at least 3 years. 186  
 
An example is the merger between Avery Dennison Australia Group Holdings Pty Ltd 
and Jackstaedt Holdings Pty Ltd JAC Australia Pty Ltd. In this case, the merger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Nelson, above n 162. 
185 Allan Fels, ‘Mergers and Market Power’ (Speech delivered at the Australian Financial Review 
Conference, CFO 2001 Summit, Sydney, 7 June 2001) 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/speeches/2001/pdf/Fels_AFR_ CFO_Summit_7_5_01.pdf>. 
186 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, above n 124, 5.111. 
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concentration thresholds were significantly exceeded. The merger was not opposed 
because: 
 
[W]hile the merger combines the two largest domestic manufacturers of label stock; 
customers have indicated that their ability to import, or vertically integrate their operations by 
manufacturing label stock, will constrain price levels in the market post-merger. … [T]he 
Commission notes that imports have constituted at least 10% of the Australian market for 
label stock for at least the last 3 years.187 
 
In some cases, it is not necessary for imports to have reached 10% as long as there is 
the potential for imports. A case in point is Cesco Australia Ltd and Forbes 
Engineering Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd. The proposed joint venture between these 
parties would have resulted in ‘the two largest manufacturers and services of concrete 
mixers combining their operations’. The Commission considered that despite the fact 
that existing imports ‘did not exceed 10 per cent’, there was a ‘potential for imports 
… particularly from New Zealand’ and that this was a key factor in not opposing the 
merger.188 
 
For markets where import competition is not an effective check on market power, 
barriers to entry are explored.  
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JAC Australia Pty Ltd (target) (decided 19 November 2001): Mergers Public Register 2001: 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/pubreg/s50/nov_dec_2001/138m01.pdf>. 
188 Cesco Australia Ltd (acquirer) and Forbes Engineering Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd (target) (decided 31 
October 2001): Mergers Public Register 2001: <http://www.accc.gov.au/ 
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2  The height of barriers to entry to the market 
 
The ease with which a new firm may enter a market can provide an important source 
of competitive constraint on existing operators. Markets with low barriers to entry are 
comprised of consumers that will easily switch to the operator providing the greatest 
benefit. Therefore, threats of new entrants make it unsustainable for existing operators 
to raise prices or withhold quality of services. A credible threat of new entry alone 
may actually be sufficient to regulate the market.189 
 
Barriers to entry have a wide-reach. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade 
Practices Revisions Bill 1986 (Cth) summarised barriers to entry as ‘[A]ny feature of 
a market that places an efficient prospective entrant at significant competitive 
disadvantage compared with incumbent firms’.190 Commercially, this may include 
structural or technological barriers, strategic barriers, legal and regulatory barriers, or 
any combination. Examples of these include licensing requirements, planning or 
environmental controls, industry standards, scarce resources, the threat of 
incumbents’ retaliatory actions and pre-existing economies of scale or scope such that 
a new firm may find it near impossible to established brand loyalty.191  
 
If there is a high likelihood192 of timely193 and sufficient194 entry in all relevant 
markets post-merger (low barriers to entry), it is unlikely that a merger will have the 
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190 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Revisions Bill 1986 (Cth), 5. 
191 Russell V Miller, Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (Lawbook, 37th ed, 
2015) 637; Merger Guidelines, above n 124, 7.26–7.32. 
192 The ACCC needs to be satisfied that actual or threatened entry post-merger is not just possible but 
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effect of substantially lessening competition. If barriers are high, contemplation of 
further factors may be required.  
 
The ‘Airport Monitoring Report’ describes the situation where barriers to entry are 
calculatedly created by Melbourne Airport to reduce the ability of off-airport parking 
and private bus operators to compete with the airport’s own car parking services. 195  
The ACCC found that Melbourne Airport ‘imposes excessive access levies, and 
controls the available space for [off-airport parking and private bus] operators, 
[which] affects those operators’ own prices, convenience and, therefore, attractiveness 
to consumers.’ By reducing the ability of alternative operators to successfully enter 
the market and compete, Melbourne Airport can increase demand for its own parking 
services, charge higher prices to consumers, and therefore earn monopoly profits.196  
 
Moreover, customers of Melbourne airport car park reported increasing detriment 
despite having to dig deeper into their pockets. The ‘Airport Monitoring Report 2012-
13’ revisits the latest passenger and customer ratings for these services:  
 
Ø Curbside space congestion fell to ‘poor’. 
Ø Ratings for availability of parking bays fell to ‘very poor’.  
Ø Ratings for the availability of taxiways fell to ‘poor’.197 
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195 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ‘Airport Monitoring Report 2009-10’ (2011) 
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Similar findings were presented for Sydney Airport.198  
 
3  The level of concentration in the market 
 
Any increase in market concentration resulting from a reduction in the number of 
competitors or accrual of significant additional market share will be relevant. The 
HHI threshold, as discussed, is used to determine the weight of this factor. It is the 
link between concentration and the strength of competition. 
 
For example, the ACCC opposed the merger of the number two and number three 
paint manufacturers in Barloworld/Wattyl199. The ACCC determined that the post-
merger paint manufacturer firm would have acquired 90 per cent market share.200  
 
4  The degree of countervailing power in the market 
 
Countervailing power exists where customers or suppliers have special characteristics 
allowing them to act independently of the merging parties. Such specific 
characteristics of a buyer may include – size, market power, commercial significance 
compared to suppliers or the possession of negotiating leverage over suppliers.201 In 
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George Weston/Good Stuff Bakery202 the ACCC concluded that in an acquisition in 
the wholesale market for the manufacture and distribution of bread in southern 
Queensland and northern New South Wales the major supermarket chains of Coles 
and Woolworths were likely to possess countervailing power (buyer power) and 
therefore constrain the merged firms from exercising market power.203 Therefore, the 
merger was permitted to proceed. 
 
5  The likelihood that the acquisition would result in the acquirer being able to 
significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins 
 
Sustained price increases above competitive levels are the most obvious and visible 
manifestation of market power and reduction in competition. In general, an increase 
in price will result in a corresponding increase in profit margins. For this factor, it is 
irrelevant whether the merged firm actually exercises this power.  
 
The closeness of rivalry between the merger parties and other market participants is 
also relevant. If, for a significant number of customers, the merger parties are the 
other’s closest competitor and there would be no close competitors to the merged firm 
in one or more relevant markets, the ACCC considers this environment at risk of 
substantially lessening competition.204Conversely, if the merger parties are distant 
competitors and the comparable alternatives to the merged firm are available in 
plentiful supply to the entire market then, in the absence of coordinated effects, this 
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can indicate that a merger is unlikely to substantially lessen competition.205  
 
In the Metcash case discussed above, the major supermarket chains were determined 
to be a significant constraint on the capacity of Metcash Limited to increase the price 
at which it supplied goods. A price increase of five to ten per cent could not be 
sustained without a Metcash losing business to its competitors, Coles or 
Woolworths.206 
 
6  The extent to which substitutes are available in the market or are likely to be 
available in the market 
 
The availability or potential availability of readily substitutable products in a market 
provides consumers with viable alternatives to switch to if the merged firm seeks to 
raise prices. The extent to which substitutability constrains the merged firm’s market 
power depends on how substitutable the other products are, however a narrow 
assessment is not adopted. It is not necessary that the competitors product be 
identical, it is a sufficient constraint if the substitute be a workable alternative.  For 
example, in Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission207 it was said that:  
 
  A wall is a wall, whether it is made of concrete blocks, tilt-up concrete bricks or clay bricks. 
The only need of the builder is to have a wall that will perform as a wall, and for the lowest 
cost possible. Within the market in which builders acquired materials for the use in the 
construction of walls there was not only the ever present threat of potential substitution but 
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actual substitution over the time.208 
 
7  The dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation and 
product differentiation 
 
When analysing the competitive effects of a merger the forward looking nature of 
merger analysis requires the ACCC, to take into account the changing nature of the 
market in the future.209  
 
Markets that are growing rapidly are more likely to see competitive new entrants and 
the erosion of market shares of incumbents over time. Conversely, markets that are 
stagnant or reducing may see the opposite.  
 
Other occurrences such as product innovation, improved distribution methodologies, 
brand loyalty or regulatory and technical changes must also be considered under 
s 50(3)(g). 
 
The 2003 Coca-Cola Amatil/Berri210merger involved the unification of the market for 
the manufacture and wholesale supply of chilled and ambient fruit juice and fruit 
drink. The ACCC observed that although there was evidence of small or regional 
entry occurring to some extent and the erosion of market shares over time, very few 
new entrants had captured meaningful market shares in recent years. On these 
grounds the merger was opposed. The parties withdrew the application. 
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8  The likelihood that the acquisition would result in the removal from the 
market of a vigorous and effective competitor 
 
The removal of a vigorous competitor from the market will have a significant impact 
on the level of competition in the market.  
 
Vigorous and effective competitors drive significant aspects of competition, such as 
pricing, innovation or product development. A merger that removes a vigorous and 
effective competitor may therefore remove one of the most effective competitive 
constraints on market participants and thereby result in a substantial lessening of 
competition.211 
 
For example, the proposed merger between Healthe/Healthscope212 involved the 
acquisition of a private hospital in the Gosford (NSW) area, where Healthe already 
operated a private hospital. The ACCC considered post-acquisition competitive 
tensions between the two hospitals would cease, leading to a reduced incentive on the 
part of Healthe to provide quality of service.213  
 
9  The nature and extent of vertical integration in the market 
 
Some horizontal mergers can be affected by vertical integration in the market. 
Vertically integrated mergers occur between two or more firms that operate within 
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varying stages of production and distribution within the same industry. For example, 
where a retailer acquires a manufacturer or wholesaler in its supply chain.  
 
Vertical integration does not reduce the total number of entities operating at one level 
in the market, but it may change patterns of industry behaviour. Vertically integrated 
firms may discriminate in favour of their own business to the detriment of the rest of 
the market. Suppliers may lose a market for their goods, retail outlets may be 
deprived of supplies and competitors may find that both supply and outlets are 
blocked. Vertical mergers may also substantially lessen competition by discouraging 
new businesses from entering the market.   
 
Trade Practices Commission v Rank Commercial Ltd214 provides an example of how 
the court interprets and applies the substantial lessening of competition test. Using the 
merger factors the court identified a number of characteristics of the market and the 
particular transaction that it determined would result in a substantial lessening of 
competition should the merger proceed.  
 
In this case, the Trade Practices Commission (TPC) successfully obtained an interim 
injunction for the duration of two months preventing Rank from proceeding with a 
public offer to acquire Foodland (FAL).215 To establish its case, the TPC relied 
primarily on the existence of a Deed of Operation between the Respondents that 
arranged a complex chain of transactions that would have ultimately seen Coles Myer 
Limited (CML) acquire the Australian assets of Foodland.  
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The ACCC was successful in obtaining an interim injunction on the basis that the 
transaction was likely to substantially lessen competition in the wholesale grocery 
market in Western Australia. In applying the SLC test the TPC examined the current 
state of the market without the merger and the hypothetical state of the market with 
the merger. It was accepted that FAL had New Zealand assets and was also the 
independent West Australian grocery wholesaler where there were already 
‘substantial barriers to entry’ into the wholesale retail market with FAL and CML 
being each other’s main rival. If CML obtained control of FAL, or of FAL’s WA 
operations, CML would ‘control approximately 75%’ of the WA retail grocery sales. 
There was likely to be a substantial lessening of competition in the retail market 
because CML would ‘directly control the supplies and retail outlets of its most 
significant competitor’. There would be ‘no alternative but to deal with CML’ and 
‘little ability to influence the terms of trade’.  
 
Rank withdrew its take-over offer of Foodland before proceeding to a final hearing in 
the Federal Court.  
 
There are three significant commercial difficulties with this counterfactual analysis. 
 
First, the counterfactual ignores the cumulative effect of mergers and acquisitions. 
Secondly, the counterfactual does not have the ability or scope to consider cross-
market concentration. Thirdly, there is no express mention of the cumulative effect of 
mergers and acquisitions in the merger factors. 
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As s 50 refers only to a single acquisition there is no power in the assessment of 
mergers and acquisitions to consider the cumulative effect of multiple acquisitions 
that raise competitive concerns.216 The application of the ‘with’ or ‘without’ 
formulation of the counterfactual nullifies the effects of any previous acquisitions on 
the market. It focuses less on capturing the ‘creeping’ effect of a series of acquisitions 
and more on preventing dominant firms from enhancing their market power.  
 
In applying the counterfactual, the present state of the market at the time the merger 
or acquisition is proposed is used as the benchmark. The ‘without’ test hypothesises 
what the future state of the market will be should the proposed merger not occur 
versus what the future state of the market is likely to be should the proposed merger 
proceed. It deliberates on the potential changes in the market and compares the 
‘hypothetical markets’ as well as the present state of the market.  
 
Should the future market with the merger stifle competition, the transaction will likely 
not be permitted to proceed. However, should the future market with the merger or 
acquisition maintain or encourage competition that would otherwise not occur the 
transaction will likely be permitted to proceed. 
 
In both cases, whether the merger or acquisition will advance or limit competition in 
the future market is a judgement call based on comparing the future market to the 
benchmark present market. Acquisitions occurring prior to the crystallisation of the 
benchmark present market do not form any part of the backdrop for assessing the 
competitive implications of a proposed transaction. The number, size, manner or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Clarke, above n 48, 6. 
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timeframe in which any previous mergers or acquisitions took place is ignored. All 
that is relevant is the current state of the market at the point in time immediately 
before the proposed merger or acquisition.   
 
For example, a market in 2015 is comprised of 10 firms, each with 10% market share. 
 
10%  + 10%  + 10%  + 10%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10% = 100% 
 
Firm A undertakes five piecemeal acquisitions over a two year period. Each 
individual acquisition increases firm A’s market share by 10%. 
 
Acq 1 
20%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10% = 100% 
 
Acq 2 
30%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10% = 100% 
 
Acq 3 
40%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10% = 100% 
Acq 4 
50%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10% = 100% 
 
Acq 5 
60%  + 10%  +  10%  + 10%  +  10% = 100% 
 
When considering the effects on competition, the counterfactual limits the analysis 
only to the acquisition immediately before the acquisition in question. The 
counterfactual does not have the scope to examine firm A’s exponential increase in 
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market share from 10% to 60% between acquisition 1 and acquisition 5. The analysis 
is restricted to each individual proposed acquisition and the relevant benchmark 
market.   
 
For acquisition 1, the benchmark state of the market comprises of firm A possessing 
10% market share. The future hypothetical state of the market with the proposed 
acquisition sees firm A increase their market share by an unalarming 10% - to 20%. 
 
For acquisition 2, the composition of the market after acquisition 1 (firm A with 20% 
market share) becomes the new benchmark state of the market. Again, the future 
hypothetical state of the market with the second proposed acquisition sees firm A 
increase their market share by an unalarming 10% - to 30%. 
 
As this example highlights, the proposed hypothetical market for the counterfactual 
analysis of acquisition 1 has now become the present benchmark market for 
acquisition 2. The counterfactual analysis neutralises the increase to 10%, rather than 
for what it really is – a 20% increase in market share. 
 
This cycle can continue until firm A achieves a market share of 60% yet the 
transactions are only ever analysed in 10% increases; despite the fact that firm A’s 
increase is actually six fold.  
 
From a theoretical point of view it is easy to understand that while a merger that gives 
a large firm an extra 5% market share is unlikely to lead to substantial anti-
competitive effects (depending on the relevant market dynamics), four similar 
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transactions by the same large firm which increase its market share from 40% to 60% 
will almost certainly do so.217 In this way creeping acquisitions circumvent s 50, with 
little to no recourse.218 
 
While there is an argument for certainty, commercially, markets are not linear. 
Dealings permitted to proceed today can have an anti-competitive impact on the 
market in a year from now. Certainty must be balanced with fairness, sustainability 
and the correction of anti-competitive conduct. The advantage of a creeping 
acquisition provision or the like would allow the regulator to address and prevent 
industries from becoming incrementally concentrated as a result of creeping 
acquisition activity. To balance the need for certainty, the recommendations discussed 
later in this article suggest legislating a review period of two years that the ACCC and 
courts may look back to cumulate transactions. Where appropriate, any mergers or 
acquisitions during this two year period may be considered as one. 
 
As currently defined, the counterfactual ‘with’ or ‘without’ test also does not provide 
power to the ACCC to consider the level of concentration an entity may possess 
across numerous unrelated markets. The narrowness of the counterfactual does not 
permit considerations of cross-market concentration as it is focused solely on 
competition in the defined market in which the merger or acquisition is proposed to 
occur.219 That is, the existing rules do not currently require or allow the ACCC or the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Genna Robb, ‘Creeping Mergers – should we be concerned? A Case Study of Hospital Mergers in 
South Africa’ (Paper presented at the Seventh Annual Conference on Competition Law, Economics 
and Policy, 5 and 6 September 2013). 
218 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission to Competition and Consumer 
Policy Division of the Commonwealth Treasury, Creeping Acquisitions: Discussion Paper 1, 23 
October 2008, 5. 
219 This is to be differentiated from conglomerate mergers that involve firms that interact across several 
separate markets and supply products that are typically in some way related to each other. For example, 
products in neighbouring markets or products that are complementary in either demand or supply, such 
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Courts to analyse all past history when they determine whether the latest acquisition 
has substantially lessened competition.  
 
Cross-market concentration refers to high levels of aggregate concentration in 
markets where a small group of economic entities controls large parts of the economic 
activity through holdings in many ‘unrelated’ markets. For example, where multiple 
subsidiaries or branches of the same parent entity operate and dominate different 
unrelated markets. 
 
Cross-market concentration is a concern in Australia and in jurisdictions around the 
world.220 In Australia, there are already examples of powerful corporates having 
extended their reach across a vast range of industries and markets. For example, the 
Woolworths group is made up of four main divisions: Supermarkets, General 
Merchandise (Big W and consumer electronics), Hotels (via its 75% shareholding in 
ALH) and Wholesale. 221 The Supermarkets Division alone comprises Australian 
Food and Liquor, Petrol and New Zealand Supermarkets. 
 
For merger analysis, each of these divisions and subdivisions operate in separate and 
distinct markets with Woolworths being a dominant player in each of these markets. 
Woolworths’ grocery/supermarket business has ‘partnered’ with its petrol retailing 
business through the use of shopper docket incentives. In this arrangement, 4-cent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
as staples and staplers.219 The issue of conglomerate markets was addressed by amendments to s 50 
intended to clarify the ability of the ACCC or a court to consider multiple markets when assessing 
mergers. While this expanded the ACCC’s ability to consider the totality of the competitive effects 
resulting from an acquisition, it continues to fall short in assessing situations of unrelated cross-market 
concentration. 
220 Michael S Gal and Thomas K Cheng, ‘Aggregate Concentration: A Study of Competition Law 
Solutions’ (2016) 4 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2, 282-322. 
221 Woolworths Limited, Woolworths Annual Report 2015, 116. 
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discounts are offered on fuel purchases at Woolworths 516 petrol sites and 92 Caltex-
operated sites222 when a customer spends $30 or more on groceries from Woolworths’ 
supermarkets. These redemptions link money spent in one division to redemption 
discounts in another division in an unrelated market. Likewise, the shopper dockets 
customers receive when they purchase items from a Coles supermarket contain a 
discount that can be redeemed at participating Shell petrol retailers. 
 
While the ACCC has confirmed this arrangement is not in itself anti-competitive, the 
concern for merger analysis is that this cross-market domination is not considered 
when determining the counterfactual. These cross-market benefits should be 
considered during merger analysis.  
 
Looking at the 9 merger factors now, while the merger guidelines are a powerful tool 
they offer little assistance on the issue of creeping acquisitions, and what guidance 
they may offer has no legislative force.223  
 
The 2008 Merger Guidelines are substantially more discretionary than the 1999 
Merger Guidelines. This is the result of two particular aspects of the current 
guidelines. First, the use of uncertain and imprecise language; and second, the 
removal of the safe harbour. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Ibid, 25. 
223 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Competition and Consumer Legislation 
Amendment Act 2011 (3 September 2014) 
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Merger%20guidelines.pdf>. 
77	  
	  
In the 1999 Merger Guidelines, the potential harm relating to creeping acquisitions 
was acknowledged, but not completely addressed. Paragraph 3.31 of the 1999 Merger 
Guidelines provided that: 
 
The Commission may, under s 50, also consider the collective effect of shareholdings that are 
acquired incrementally over a period. In particular, the Corporations Law permits acquisitions 
beyond 20 per cent (the normal takeover threshold), of up to 3 per cent every six months 
without triggering the requirement for a full takeover offer. The initial acquisition may not 
raise substantial competition concerns, and each incremental acquisition may not give rise to a 
substantial lessening of competition in its own right. However, collectively the acquisitions 
may give rise to competition concerns and may eventually deliver control of the target 
company. The Commission considers that the Act may apply to such creeping acquisitions.  
 
Paragraph 5.99 added: 
 
A further relevant consideration is the extent of the increase in concentration. In many 
situations the acquisition of a small market player, resulting in a small increase in 
concentration, will have little effect on competition. However, in some instances a small 
increase in concentration may involve the removal of a market participant which played a 
significant role in maintaining a competitive market, e.g. by undermining attempts to 
coordinate market conduct. In other circumstances a small acquisition may form part of a 
pattern of creeping acquisitions, which have a significant cumulative effect on competition.  
 
Paragraph 5.99 went on to acknowledge that vertical mergers, although they may 
involve no increase in concentration, may still enable the extension of market power 
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into a vertically related market – which is the preferred structure of the supermarket 
duopoly today.224 
 
This express mention of creeping acquisitions or ‘small increases’ was omitted from 
the 2008 Merger Guidelines so they no longer refer in any way to the cumulative 
effect of previous acquisitions.225 No explanation has been provided as to why this 
section was omitted. 
 
There is an argument that the current merger factors and Merger Guidelines provide 
scope for the ACCC to consider creeping acquisitions. The view is that Parts 5 and 6 
of the 2008 Merger Guidelines inexplicitly address the competition problems 
associated with creeping acquisitions226 by requiring assessment of competitive 
effects based on the theories of competitive harm – namely, unilateral or coordinate 
effects that may arise as a result of the acquisition.227 In cases where unilateral or 
coordinate effects amount to a significant and sustainable increase in the market 
power of the merged firm or other firms in a market, the merger is likely to 
substantially lessen competition in contravention of the CCA. Similarly, s 50(3)(g) – 
‘the dynamic characteristics of the market including growth, innovation and product 
differentiation’ – is claimed to be sufficiently broad in scope to permit a court or the 
ACCC to consider issues such as creeping acquisitions.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, above 108, 5.99. 
Vertical mergers may involve no increase in concentration, but may enable the extension of market 
power into a vertically related market.  
225 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, above 108, 5.99. 
226 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, above 124, 3.31 and 
5.99. 
227 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Parliament of Australia, above 108, 11. 
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The uncertainty created by drawing inferences from the current Merger Guidelines to 
cover the issue of creeping acquisitions seems an unnecessary stretch. Furthermore, 
what implicit guidance can be extrapolated from the current merger guidelines is 
weak. A decision handed down by the ACCC that a merger or acquisition is anti-
competitive as a result of the cumulative effects on competition rather than the 
isolated effect of the merger would be unlikely to survive legal challenge. That is, it 
would be beyond the power of the regulator under the existing legislation to prohibit a 
merger based on the effects of a series of mergers which are said to collectively 
offend the existing law. 
 
Secondly, while providing a useful illustration of the application of the HHI, the 
Merger Guidelines have no statutory effect and are not binding on the ACCC or the 
Court. Thus, collective mergers with anti-competitive effects may be ignored in the 
decision making process. For example, the Grocery Inquiry reported the HHI for the 
retailing of packaged groceries market to be between 2750 and 3000.228  
 
Given the Merger Guidelines state that the ACCC considers markets to be 
concentrated when the HHI is greater than 2000, clearly, according to the ACCC’s 
own definition, the market for packaged groceries is concentrated to a level that 
requires action on the part of the regulator. Surprisingly, this level of concentration 
appears to be overlooked and given little weight. Mergers and acquisitions in this 
market continue to be permitted despite exceeding the concentration ratios used to 
identify commercial behaviour that is prima facie anti-competitive. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia Pty Ltd, above n 37, 5. 
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In 2011 it was noted that the Merger Guidelines have not been referred to by an 
Australian court considering a merger matter.229 This is contrasted to the situation in 
the US. While the US Merger Guidelines230 are also a statement of agency 
enforcement policy that is not binding on the courts,231 in practice, the US courts have 
relied heavily on them.232 In the US, the Merger Guidelines are given ‘precedent-like’ 
treatment by the courts, in some cases, the courts even seem to have given the Merger 
Guidelines more weight than their own precedent. 233 
 
While this more extreme treatment may be inappropriate for a statement of policy, 
this arguably points to the need for action to encourage Australian courts to place 
greater importance on the Merger Guidelines. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
The need for specific provisions to be introduced that regulate creeping acquisitions 
and prevent any anti-competitive consequences is required to prevent firms 
‘exploiting the ‘loophole’ in the legislation’.234 The objectives of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 John Duns and Arlen Duke, Competition Law: Cases & Materials (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd 
ed, 2011) 110. 
230 Issued jointly by the DoJ and the FTC. 
231 Chicago Bridge & Iron Co v FTC 534 F 3d 410, 431 n 11(5th Cir 2), cited in The Anti Trust Source, 
‘The Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Can the Courts be Persuaded (October 2010) 
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct10_Brannon10_21f.aut
hcheckdam.pdf>. 
232 The Anti Trust Source, ‘The Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Can the Courts be Persuaded 
(October 2010) 2 
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct10_Brannon10_21f.aut
hcheckdam.pdf>. 
233 United States v Baker Hughes 731 F Supp 3 (DDC 1990) and FTC v Cardinal Health Inc 12 F Supp 
2d 34, 53 (DDC 1998), cited in The Anti Trust Source, ‘The Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines: 
Can the Courts be Persuaded (October 2010) 
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct10_Brannon10_21f.aut
hcheckdam.pdf>. 
234 Law Council of Australia, Submission to Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
Consumer Amendment Bill 2010, 5. 
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recommendations touched on in this Chapter and to be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Five will empower the regulators to deal pro-actively with the competitive 
impacts created by creeping acquisitions. Competition is critical to the market 
economy and it is a critical role of Governments worldwide to keep the economy 
open for competition. The answer involves a balance of securing the efficiencies that 
may arise from mergers or acquisitions and ensuring that those efficiencies are passed 
on to consumers. While this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, a 
mandatory notification regime inspired by comparable countries such as the US and 
UK would be preferred, with an expansion of the threshold test to require notification 
when the cumulative value of all entities over the previous two years exceeds 
reasonable thresholds. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – HOW HAVE CREEPING ACQUISITIONS BEEN REGULATED 
ABROAD? 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2002 the International Competition Network (ICN)235 and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)236 released a report entitled 
Policy Roundtables: Substantive Criteria Used for Merger Assessment (OECD 
Report). The OECD Report assessed the criteria used for merger assessment in its 
member states. In this, the Secretariat posed a number of hypotheticals to the 
participating 19 member states.237 One of those questions being: 
 
Please explain why you do or do not believe that the choice of substantial lessening of 
competition or dominance test would make a difference in reviewing … a series of small 
mergers which appear to be leading to the creation of a firm having significant market power. 
 
The OECD Report reflected a high recognition from various international 
jurisdictions that creeping acquisitions are a serious issue in the competition space 
and are not easily addressed under current substantial lessening of competition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 The ICN mission statement is to advocate the adoption of superior standards and procedures in 
competition policy around the world, formulate proposals for procedural and substantive convergence, 
and seek to facilitate effective international cooperation to the benefit of member agencies, consumers 
and economies worldwide. 
236 The OECD Competition Committee has devoted substantial efforts to studying the merger review 
process and its work helped inform the development of the ICN Recommended Practices. The OECD 
and ICNs ‘international best practices’ are used as a guidepost and define a path to address many of the 
concerns identified with the merger review process. Australia is one of over 100 member countries of 
the ICN. 
237 Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, South 
Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States. 
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tests.238 It was widely acknowledged239 that creeping acquisitions could be difficult to 
address under both the substantial lessening of competition test and the dominance 
test.240 Of the 19 states providing submissions, only Germany and Mexico indicated 
unequivocally that their current merger regime, whether it be a dominance test or 
substantial lessening of competition test, would be sufficient to address creeping 
acquisitions.241 A small number of states242 with little comparability to Australia 
deemed the consideration irrelevant in the context of their anti-trust system.  
 
The remainder of this Chapter will explain the approach various jurisdictions have 
taken to regulate creeping acquisitions. 
 
A Europe 
 
The European Commission Merger Regulation (ECMR) is the main legislative text 
for merger decisions within the EU.243 The ECMR regulates competition in the EU by 
prohibiting mergers that would significantly impede effective competition in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Metcash Limited, Submission to Competition and Consumer Policy Division of the Commonwealth 
Treasury, Creeping Acquisitions: Discussion Paper 1, 10 August 2008, 5.6. 
239 By Australia, Brazil, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Nederland, New Zealand and 
Norway. 
240 Under the dominance test, mergers resulting in the creation of a firm in a dominant position in a 
substantial market for goods and services in Australia, or a State or Territory of Australia, were 
prohibited. 
241 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Policy Roundtables: Substantive 
Criteria Used for Merger Assessment’ (Report, 2002) 181, 235. 
<http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/2500227.pdf>. 
242 Chinese Taipei, Czech Republic, Korea and Spain. 
243 European Commission, Merger Regulation (25 November 2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/regulations.html>. 
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primary market, or in a substantial part of a market.244 The ECMR prohibits mergers 
resulting in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.245  
 
The ECMR does not expressly define creeping acquisitions however it does consider 
a series of previous transactions if they have taken place ‘within a reasonable period 
of time even if they fall below turnover thresholds.’ 246 The ECMR explains that a 
single concentration will also arise in cases where control over one undertaking is 
acquired by a series of transactions in securities from one or several sellers taking 
place within a reasonably short period of time. The concentration in these situations is 
not limited to the acquisitions of the ‘one and decisive’ share, but will cover all the 
acquisitions of securities. This approach also aggregates acquisitions carried out 
between different entities belonging to the same group. The provision applies to two 
or more transactions between the same persons or undertakings if they are carried out 
simultaneously. Such simultaneous transactions between the same parties are deemed 
to form a single concentration even if they are not connected with each other. 
 
Although the term ‘within a reasonable period of time’ is not defined, Article 5(2) 
subparagraph 2 provides a specific rule which allows the Commission to consider two 
or more transactions taking place within a two-year period between the same persons 
or undertakings to be treated as one and the same concentration arising on the date of 
the last transaction. This is irrespective of whether or not those transactions relate to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (published in Official Journal L 395, 30 December 1989 as last amended Official 
Journal L40, 13 February 1998), Article 3. 
245 OECD, above n 241, 309. 
246 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Creeping Acquisitions, Discussion Paper 1, 
2008, 73. 
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parts of the same business or concern the same sector.247 The two-year rule does not 
apply where other persons or undertakings join the same persons or undertakings for 
only some of the transactions involved.248 This two-year review period has been 
adopted across many European nations.249 
 
The objective of this provision is to capture cases of attempted circumnavigation of 
the ECMR merger regulations.250 The provision ensures that entities do not 
strategically breakdown an overall transaction into a series of smaller acquisitions 
over a period of time that individually do not exceed turnover thresholds but 
cumulatively do have that effect. 
 
Within the EU region, Finland reported experiencing great difficulty in addressing 
creeping acquisitions. Finland currently adheres to the dominance regime explaining 
that a series of small mergers will only be covered by the dominance test when the 
required level of dominance is achieved. For example, a merger between the number 
two and number three firms in the market that does not result in the merged entity 
becoming the number one firm would not be covered by this dominance test.  
 
Finnish merger controls implement an explicit merger provision to account for a 
series of small mergers in line with the ‘two-year rule’.251 According to Articles 
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11b(4) and (5) of the Finnish Competition Act (661/2012), where business operations 
are acquired through two or more successive transactions, the turnover of the target of 
the acquisition shall mean the combined turnover related to the business operations 
acquired from the same entity or foundation, and the turnovers of the entities or 
foundations acquired within the same industry in Finland during the two years 
preceding.252 In any successive two-year period,253 the turnovers of the business 
operations acquired are cumulated. 
 
Similarly in Hungary, the Hungarian Office of Economic Competition can prohibit a 
transaction at any time within a two-year period where a series of mergers places the 
acquiring firm in an economic position of market power, allowing the firm to act 
independently of the market.254 
 
Lithuania acknowledged that a problem could arise with the practical application of 
either the dominance or substantial lessening of competition test if any small merger 
were to be analysed in isolation and treated as neither being a substantial lessening of 
competition nor creating or strengthening of a dominant position.255  
 
The UK, Spain, Norway and the Netherlands insist that in such a scenario of creeping 
acquisitions there seems to be little difference between the ultimate outcome of 
applying a substantial lessening of competition test or a dominance test given the 
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similarities in these two competition assessments. Each nation had its own view on 
why this is so.  
 
Spain commented: 
 
These models include heterogeneous criteria with many common aspects which are ultimately 
based on economic analysis and which lead to the same results in the vast majority of cases. 
 
Despite this indifference, the Spanish regard the substantial lessening of competition 
test to better fit with economic analysis and that it would allow more flexibility 
especially when dealing with small-scale mergers.256  
 
The Dutch view other considerations, such as specific market structure, conditions of 
the market place, and freedom of interpretation of the antitrust authority, to be more 
influential than the question of which test is to be applied.257 
 
Although Norway adheres to the substantial lessening of competition test, it also does 
not believe it to make any difference if the substantive test were dominance instead of 
substantial lessening of competition.258 Under s 16 of the Competition Act 2004 
(Norway) merger control is based on a twofold test consisting of a substantial 
lessening of competition test and an efficiency test. The substantial lessening of 
competition test permits the Competition Authority to intervene in mergers that create 
or strengthen significant market power. An intervention under s 16 can only be 
directed against that merger in the series of mergers, which would create a situation of 
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significant market power. Thus, if the firm does not already possess significant 
market power that authority cannot intervene until significant market power is created 
by that final transaction pushing the entity over the threshold. It is not possible under 
current competition law to stop a ‘wave of mergers’ in its incipiency. The New 
Zealand submission expressed similar confusion as to what point, if at all the 
threshold would be triggered in these cases.259 
 
An example of this in practice could be seen in the Norwegian electricity market. The 
major producer in the market – Statkraft – announced an intention to acquire a 
significant portion of its competitors. Previous to this the Competition Authority had 
considered competition somewhat restricted but not substantially restricted. It was not 
until after the last acquisition of Agder Energi however that the Authority considered 
that Statkraft had reached the requisite level of significant market power in order to 
intervene. Therefore, only the last acquisition was prohibited.260 A divesture of the 
previous creeping acquisitions could not be ordered.  
 
The UK Enterprise Act 2002 expressly addresses creeping acquisitions. Section 29, 
titled ‘Obtaining control by stages’ permits, where appropriate, the decision making 
authority to consider two or more transactions that have occurred within a two year 
period to be treated as having occurred simultaneously on the date on which the latest 
of them occurred. Where the last of a series of transaction is an anticipated merger 
and has not yet been completed, the Competition Markets Authority (CMA) may still 
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take this anticipated merger into consideration even though it may not actually be 
completed in the two-year period.261 
 
The CMA also possesses broad powers to investigate industries which are suspected 
to be showing anti-competitive effects associated with creeping acquisitions. If 
problems are found and a requisite degree of market disintegration is established, 
severe remedies can be imposed including requiring firms to divest assets or business 
units. For example in the recent market study into the airports sector the CMA found 
that the common ownership of airports in certain regions posed problems for 
competition and required British Airports Authority to divest several airports.262 
 
The CMA’s method to investigating the competitive effects of a series of creeping 
acquisitions involves a case-by-case examination rather than a law of general 
application.263 The CMA investigates several facets of anti-competitive activity, 
including whether an acquisition in the UK will create certain market features to 
prevent, restrict or distort competition and particularly whether the acquisition will 
have any adverse effects on competition in a market.264 While this is very much 
substantial lessening of competition terminology,265 like Spain, Norway and the 
Netherlands, the UK is of the view that the two tests are likely to yield the same 
outcome in a situation of creeping acquisitions: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Jurisdictional and Procedural Guidance, para 4.33. Article 3, Enterprise Act 2002 (Anticipated 
Mergers) Order 2003, SI 2003/1595. 
262 Competition and Markets Authority, ‘BAA Airports: Evaluation of the Competition  
Commission’s 2009 Market Investigation Remedies (16 May 2016). 
263 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 246, 70. 
264 Ibid, 68. 
265 John Davies, Getting The Deal Through – Merger Control 2010 (September 2014) 
<https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/20/merger-control/>. 
90	  
	  
Where one of a series of mergers leads to an immaterial increase in market power then it is 
unlikely to be viewed as reinforcing or creating a dominant position or as a substantial 
lessening of competition. On the other hand, where such a small merger led to a material 
increase in market power, by definition, it is not a reinforcement or creation of a dominant 
position and substantial lessening of competition.266 
 
The discussion will now be widened beyond the EU.  
 
B The Americas 
 
US law and experience has had considerable influence on other jurisdictions. They 
have also published detailed Horizontal Merger Guidelines. These guidelines adopt 
the substantial lessening of competition test for merger analysis so that mergers are 
prohibited if they create a ‘substantial lessening of competition or tend to create a 
monopoly267 in any market’.268 Merger guidelines indicate that the FCT or DoJ will 
oppose a merger if it is ‘likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its 
exercise.’ The statute has also been interpreted to prohibit mergers that worsen the 
competitive health of markets that already exhibit weak competition, and mergers, 
that while preserving the status quo, forestall future competition.269  
 
When the FCT or DoJ review a merger that has come to their attention, they typically 
evaluate each individual transaction on its own merits. Each transaction is subject to 
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the question of whether or not the transaction at issue will lead directly to anti-
competitive effects.270  
 
While the analytical framework is forward-looking and therefore does not specifically 
look back to previous acquisitions, it does explicitly entail considerations of 
‘changing market conditions’ because ‘recent or ongoing changes in the market may 
indicate that the current market share of a particular firm either understates or 
overstates the likely future competitive significance.’271 This widens the authority’s 
consideration beyond statutory concentration ratios and notification thresholds. It 
acknowledges that in some cases while these may not be triggered by the single 
transaction being reviewed, there may still be significant competitive effects. The US 
competition authorities opine that: 
 
Concentration trends alone are irrelevant except insofar as they might suggest that somewhat 
more severe anti-merger rules be applied when an industry reaches or approaches a particular 
level of concentration ... In that event it is the present market structure that is critical.272 
 
In the US in 1996, over 1000 mergers resulted from the liberalisation of previous 
statutory limitations on radio ownership. This catalysed a rapid consolidation of the 
industry in which the DoJ brought a number of cases. One such case was American 
Radio Systems Corp’s merger with EZ Communications. The DoJ’s action arose out 
of a series of proposed acquisitions by American Radio and EZ, culmination in the 
American Radio/EZ merger. In the Charlotte Metro Survey Area, these transactions 
would have resulted in American Radio having 55% of Charlotte’s radio advertising 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 OECD, above n 241, 295. 
271 The United States Department of Justice, Concentration and Market Shares (29 July 2015) 
<https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index>-concentration-and-market-shares 
272 OECD, above n 241, 295. 
92	  
	  
revenue. In the Sacramento Metro Survey Area, the merger would have given 
American Radio 36% of Sacramento’s radio advertising revenues.273 The US 
authority had the ambit to consider the series of transactions in their totality rather 
than the effect of each individual transaction. This resulted in the divestiture of KSSJ-
FM and another Sacramento FM station from American Radio Corp in order for the 
proposed transactions to proceed and the market to remain competitive. 
 
In a press release by the DoJ concerning this case, the DoJ explicitly stated that when 
considering the effects on consumers, consumers encompassed small business that 
rely on competition to keep prices low.274 This is contrasted to Australian competition 
law that does not offer protection to small business. A narrow perspective that 
requires change. 
 
The competition issues raised by creeping acquisitions are relatively similar in both 
the Australian and US experience.275 The US authorities in some cases appear to have 
considered the effect of a series of mergers despite not having explicit legislation. The 
US appears to acknowledge in some capacity that incrementally accruing 
concentration via creeping acquisitions should be considered during a merger review, 
and where required, action on behalf of the authority should be taken to preserve 
competition. In the case above, that action was a negotiated divestiture. 
 
Mexican competition law can be regarded a mixture of substantial lessening of 
competition, dominance and the substantial market power model. Similar too many 
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European states but unlike Australia, notifications of concentrations are compulsory 
when certain established thresholds are surpassed.276 Compulsory notification 
empowers the Federal Competition Commission to investigate all concentrations that 
point to a probability of creating a firm with significant market power.  
 
C New Zealand 
 
New Zealand and Australia’s similarities and proximity create a close economic 
relationship. Both nations have very similar market structures. They are both 
geographically isolated, have small populations, relatively small markets and share 
very similar competition policy and statutes. In 2001 the Commerce Act 1986 (NZ) 
was amended to align more closely with Australia’s then Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth). The NZ regime does not regulate specifically for creeping acquisitions. Like 
Australia, the NZ substantial lessening of competition test prohibits the acquisition of 
shares or assets of a business if it would have, or be likely to have, the effect of 
substantial lessening of competition in a market.277  
 
In its submission to the OECD, NZ indicated little difference between the substantial 
lessening of competition and dominance test. NZ conceded the substantial lessening 
of competition test did have a real effect at an earlier point than the dominance test. It 
relied on the fact the substantial lessening of competition sets a lower threshold than 
the dominance test, however difficulty remained in identifying the point where small 
acquisitions trigger the substantial lessening of competition test. The central difficulty 
remains knowing at what point to intervene – that is to say, at what point is the 
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substantial lessening of competition threshold triggered?278 These uncertainties 
compromise the efficient regulation of creeping acquisitions. In the New Zealand 
Commerce Commission’s 2016 Consumer Issues Report, they described creeping 
acquisitions as harmful to market structures and were given a high risk of harm 
rating.279 It has been listed by the Commission in the 5 ‘current issues and emerging 
risks to consumers from markets’ for New Zealand. 
 
The echo of Australia’s concerns in the similar jurisdiction of New Zealand further 
suggests reform around creeping acquisitions needs to occur.  
 
II WOULD REGULATION PUT AUSTRALIA OUT OF STEP WITH INTERNATIONAL 
BEST PRACTICE? 
 
Creeping acquisitions are now a feature of most merger regimes around the world. 
There is a significant variation across jurisdictions in what form and how merger 
review tests are articulated. How a merger review test is applied is as important as 
how it is formulated. Application of even the same formulation varies considerably 
across jurisdictions. In this way, there is no ‘consensus’ on the approach to creeping 
acquisitions. No uniform resolutions have been made or adopted by the OECD or ICN 
that dictate best practice for addressing creeping acquisitions. 
 
By legislating to deal explicitly with this issue, Australia would not be diverging from 
current international best practice, but pioneering the movement. Introducing a law to 
address creeping acquisitions, which does not throw out the current test but provides 
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for the consideration of a new factor (that is, creeping acquisitions), is not ‘radical’ 
and is not moving Australia away from international merger standards. The options 
available to address the creeping acquisitions issue vary in scope. For example, one 
recommendation that will be explored later in this article is the adoption of mandatory 
notification and corporate unbundling orders which are widely used and proclaimed 
mechanisms in line with international best practice that Australia is currently out of 
step with.  
 
III CONCLUSION 
 
A number of countries in the developed world have passed legislation in an attempt to 
deal with the issue. To an extent this has mitigated the risk; however it is widely 
acknowledged that creeping acquisitions continue to be a prevalent and concerning 
practice that requires further attention.  The recommendations in Chapter Five will 
draw on the effective and ineffective features of these varying systems. The 
recommendations will apply and refine some of these approaches and encourage 
Australia to pioneer a more explicit response to the issue. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – PROPOSED MODELS FOR ADDRESSING CREEPING 
ACQUISITIONS  
 
It is beyond the powers of the legislature and authorities to change the organic 
characteristics of the Australian market. However, the Government does have a 
responsibility to protect the Australian market place from anti-competitive behaviour 
and market disruption. The words of the late Honourable Sir Garfield Barwick are as 
pertinent to this contemporary debate as they were over 50 years ago: 
 
I have formed myself the view that the maintenance of competition is, in the broad, 
indispensable to our economic growth. It seems to me that the pattern of trading in this 
community should be set on a competitive basis now, before the restrictive tendencies now 
present become entrenched to the point where their dislodgement would entail too great a 
business upheaval.280 
 
Legislators must be vigilant about ensuring companies do not thwart the competition 
laws by acquiring dominance ‘under the radar’ of legislative prohibition.281 
Implementing a regime that acknowledges this is vital. A strategy of incrementally 
acquiring smaller competitors to avoid the substantial lessening of competition 
threshold is repugnant to the competition model and is undoubtedly also repugnant to 
the objectives of competition policy and law.  
 
Prevention is the best-case solution to avoiding anti-competitive dominance and 
consumer detriment. Australia ought to be proactive in implementing a framework 
that deals with creeping acquisitions so that detriment can be subdued and benefits 
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unlocked. A reactive approach prolongs the adverse effects of creeping acquisitions 
and the damage to competition may be irreparable.   
 
This Chapter will present and critically analyse a number of recommendations with 
the objective of introducing safeguards that empower administrators and decision 
makers to regulate those mergers and acquisitions likely to or currently displaying 
anti-competitive cumulative outcomes. The recommendations include the introduction 
of an additional merger factor (j) into s 50(3) of the CCA to enable the ACCC to 
assess the cumulative effect of the current and previous acquisitions; a contemporary 
interpretation that enlarges the objects of the CCA to explicitly permit prohibition 
based on anti-competitive intentions towards small enterprises; introducing a 
mandatory notification regime for mergers that breach high risk thresholds and 
Commissioner’s declarations that bestow a watching brief and extra regulatory 
obligations on high risk entities or industries. 
 
I AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPETITION ACT 
 
A Enlarging the Preamble 
 
The performance of competition agencies depends not only on the way agencies 
implement specific policies but also on their legal and institutional design. 
Competition agencies need to not only define and implement their strategies and goals 
but also design the appropriate instruments to measure the degree of accomplished 
goals. To achieve this, competition policy needs to clearly define what it intends to do 
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and the competition agency needs to make sure it actually does that. The first step for 
understanding the intention of a piece of legislation is the objects clause.  
 
The objects clause outlines the underlying purposes of the legislation and can be used 
to resolve uncertainty and ambiguity. Objects clauses assist the courts and others in 
the interpretation of legislation.282 Section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 
(Cth) states that: 
 
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose 
or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or 
not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. 
 
The objects clause of the CCA is enshrined in section 2 of the CCA. It reads:  
 
The object of this Act is to enhance the welfare of Australia through the promotion of 
competition and fair-trading and the provision of consumer protection.  
 
The CCA is a complex piece of legal drafting and the distinction between promoting 
competition and protecting competitors is well worth the debate. Whilst regard must 
be had to the objects clause to resolve any uncertainty or ambiguity, it does not 
control clear statutory language, or command a particular outcome of exercise of 
discretionary power.283 Moreover, the terms that appear in s 2 are not defined terms in 
the Act. They are open to an evolved and contemporary interpretation that preserves 
the effectiveness of the competitive process and should not be given a narrow 
interpretation that defeats the effectiveness of the Act.  
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Competition law is an economic law and must evolve with our understanding of how 
the economy functions. So far as the language permits, it should receive the meaning 
that ensures the achievements of its objects.284 It is instructive to reflect on Kirby J’s 
statement in Visy Paper Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission: 
 
It is in the context of such legislative opacity and unwieldiness that it is essential, in my view, 
to adopt a construction of the TPA that achieves the apparent purpose of that Act by furthering 
the objectives of Australian competition law. Keeping such purposes in mind helps to shine 
the light essential to finding one’s way through the maze created by statutory language.285  
 
This article argues that an interpretation of the objects clause that affords no 
consideration to the preservation of small enterprise is outdated, narrow and 
inflexible.286 It calls for an interpretation that contemplates contemporary issues and 
aligns with commercial realities.  
 
The current construction of the objects clause is a multifaceted policy objective and 
coordinated approach that can be used to protect both consumers and afford 
protection of business-to-business transactions. Analysing the elements of the objects 
clause reveals that embedded in the object of the CCA is scope for legislators to not 
just examine the effect of the action of dominant businesses but also the intent behind 
those actions. 
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Determining legality by looking beyond merely the commercial facts and outcomes of 
a transaction, and into the intent of the controlling mind behind a transaction is a 
contemporary concept that has also become the focus of other areas of Australian 
corporate law. For example, under the General Anti-Avoidance Provisions in Part 
IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1977 (Cth), efficient schemes that are entered 
into for the dominant purpose of creating a tax advantage or benefit, that would 
otherwise be legal, but for the egregious intention behind the arrangement, are 
outlawed and the orchestrators of these offences can face serious penalties. 
 
Applying this to competition law, competition policy is not about the pursuit of 
competition as an end in itself, but about promoting the competitive process where 
there are public benefits to be gained. The action is the protection of small enterprise, 
but the benefit is the preservation and promotion of competition for the long term.  
 
The key terms in the objects clause will be examined now.  
 
First, what is ‘welfare’ and how is it achieved? Welfare is a very broad term. In rare 
cases competition policy accounts for producer welfare. Producer welfare focuses on 
market participants other than those who consume goods or services in the Australian 
economy. Producer welfare is generally explored ancillary to a total welfare 
assessment that weighs up consumer welfare against producer welfare – that is, 
balancing anti-competitive effects with efficiency gains.287 In practice, certain anti-
competitive mergers that result in significant efficiency gains may be authorised to 
proceed on public benefit grounds.  
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For the most part however, the objects of Australian competition law promote 
consumer welfare – competitive pricing, choice and quality in goods and services. 
Under this approach, conduct is assessed according to whether it is likely to lead to 
lower prices, greater choice and innovation on the one hand, or an increase in prices, 
reduction in choice or pause in innovation, on the other. These benefits, as examined 
are the product of competition and competitive rivalry. In this context, creeping 
acquisitions present a double-edged sword. They might initially give rise to 
economies of scale that reduce the costs of the merged entity and should result in 
lower prices for consumers. Consumers say, this is great and welfare is achieved. As 
these acquisitions gather inertia, more and more competitors are eliminated. The 
elimination of sufficient small business competitors has profound consequences for 
consumer welfare. This confers market power on the dominant entity allowing it to 
raise prices to the detriment of consumers. This reduces consumer welfare. 
 
In this way, preserving small business is in the interests of enhancing consumer 
welfare. Small business creates jobs for Australians and its presence in the market 
place encourages new competition. The Senate Committee’s Milk Report agreed with 
this proposition. It considered that the Act could best protect competition by 
maintaining a range of competitors (large and small), who should rise and fall in 
accordance with the results of competitive rather than anti-competitive conduct, such 
as creeping acquisitions.288 At the end of the day, while small business may be the 
obvious victim of the misuse of market power, the real victim will be the consumer. 
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The second element of the objects clause is the ‘promotion of competition’. The 
ACCC in interpreting competition borrows from the ‘effective competition’ and 
‘workable competition’ models.289 Finkelstein J describes both: 
 
Effective competition requires internal and external conditions. The internal conditions are: 
(a) a reasonable degree of parity among the competitors; and (b) a high enough number of 
competitors to prevent effective collusion among them to rig the market. The external 
condition is easy entry. Effective competition denotes the idea that firms should be subject to 
a reasonable degree of competitive constraint from actual and potential competitors as well as 
from customers.  
 
Workable competition is to envisage the market with a sufficient number of firms (at least 
four or more) where there is no significant concentration, where all firms are constrained by 
their rivals from exercising any market power, where pricing is flexible, where barriers to 
entry and expansion are low, where there is no collusion, and where profit rates reflect risk 
and efficiency.’290 
 
The strong theme of both models is the presence of rivalry from two sources. First, 
from many competitors in the market, and secondly from the presence of imminent 
entry of rivals to the market. This rivalry fosters diversity and choice by encouraging 
innovation and entrepreneurship in response to the competitive pressure of meeting 
changing customer tastes and demands. Diversity and choice require the presence of 
many competitors and the imminent threat of potential competitors. As to what 
‘many’ means, Finkelstein J referenced four or more competitive players in the 
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market with a spread of concentration. A situation that, as the case study in Chapter 
Two highlights, is not present in some Australian markets.  
 
Therefore, where markets do not have conditions favourable to the smooth entry and 
exit of competitors, under the object of the promotion of competition, reasonable and 
lawfully justified intervention can be undertaken. This includes actions that preserve 
small business where it is needed to ensure sufficient rivalry remains in the market.  
 
This protection does not go so far as to make small business infallible in such a way 
that incentives to remain competitive in terms of price, quality and innovation are 
diminished. It ensures competition remains. That means even small business will have 
rivals who will provide sufficient competitive restraint.  
 
The last element, the ‘promotion of fair-trading’, was discussed in the Senate 
Committee’s report on The Effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in 
Protecting Small Business. After referring to s 2, the report stated: 
 
The objects of the Act … also refer to ‘fair-trading’ which suggests that traders, including 
small business, might expect protection under the Act from ‘unfair trading’. This, in turn, has 
led the Committee considering in this report the extent to which the Act … Contribute[s] to 
fairness in the general, everyday common-sense use of the term.291 
 
Fair-trading incorporates the prevention of companies from engaging in unfair trading 
practices towards both consumers and competitors.  
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Further, it was affirmed in the Harper Review that ‘consumers’ in the context of the 
objects clause includes businesses transacting with other businesses.292 In the US, the 
DoJ explicitly stated when dealing with consumers that ‘consumer’ encompasses 
small businesses that rely on competition to keep prices low.293 The reality is small 
business faces the same vulnerability as consumers. They lack the resources and 
sophistication of big companies, making them susceptible to unconscionable and 
unfair conduct in the market place. 
 
Creeping acquisitions threaten the competitive process and cannot be described as 
promoting ‘fair, vigorous and lawful competition’. Suppliers, small business 
competitors and, to an extent, consumers, are suffering serious detriment at the hands 
of agendas of creeping acquisitions.  
 
There is no definitive High Court precedent as to the interpretation of the objects 
clause of the CCA. Therefore, a contemporary interpretation would support the 
ACCC putting forward a legislative agenda aimed at backing small business suffering 
at the hands of creeping acquisitions. This would be valuable in the minimisation of 
harm associated with creeping acquisitions.294 Without a clear object, the intention 
and prohibition within s 50 is diluted.  
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B An Additional Merger Factor 
 
The second recommendation calls for the insertion of an additional merger factor (j) 
into s 50(3) that explicitly references incremental acquisitions as a relevant concern 
when determining whether a merger or acquisition would have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition. 
  
Section 50(3)(j) is proposed in the following form: 
 
[I]n determining whether the acquisition would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, 
of substantially lessening competition in a market, the following matters must be taken into 
account: 
… 
(j) the previous acquisitions undertaken by the acquirer in the market in the 
previous two years. 295 
 
On a functional level, the amendment integrates a backward looking test, to what is 
currently only a forward-looking test.296 This would permit acquisitions undertaken 
by a corporation within the previous two-year period to be considered as an aggregate 
when assessing whether or not an acquisition would have the effect, or be likely to 
have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market.297 It is important 
that previous mergers can be examined so that competition policy and any decision 
making aligns with commercial realities. To borrow the words of the Tribunal in Re 
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Howard Smith,298 the Court is concerned with ‘commercial likelihoods relevant to the 
proposed merger’. ‘The test has to be applied at a level that is commercially relevant 
or meaningful as must be the assessment of the substantial lessening of competition 
under consideration.’299 
 
Unlike other proposed regulatory models that called for a complete overhaul of the 
substantial lessening of competition test, this approach would provide the ACCC 
‘with an express ability to deal with creeping acquisitions’ whilst retaining the well 
understood substantial lessening of competition test allowing the ACCC to make a 
better assessment of the merger’s true effect on competition.  
 
Under the previously proposed aggregation model, an acquisition would be prohibited 
if the combined effect of the acquisition and any other acquisitions by the corporation 
within a six year period would substantially lessen competition.  
 
The six year ‘specified period’ attracted much criticism at the time300 and raised a 
number of conceptual difficulties.301 Market boundaries and the structure and 
functioning of markets are likely to change over time.302 This means an assessment of 
prior acquisitions to determine whether the current acquisition substantially lessens 
competition may necessitate an analysis of acquisitions on the basis of different 
market definitions and different dynamics of competition to when they occurred. 
Other criticisms included that the six year retrospective analysis may impose 
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significant uncertainty for business, may delay the merger clearance and investigation 
process by increasing pressure on businesses and the ACCC’s resources and also 
introduce a large and unnecessary cost or risk impediment to expansion or investment. 
It is agreed that any discouragement of investment that has a detrimental effect on the 
growth and robustness of the Australian economy is not desirable303 and the model 
proposed in this article has considered this.   
 
Uncertainty is also an inescapable aspect of the operation of a section based upon 
speculative likelihoods. Even the current formulation of the test in s 50 gives effect to 
a kind of competition risk management policy. All antitrust actions require qualifying 
the difference between the actual and the counterfactual. Any effects based analysis, 
including the counterfactual, has challenges. It involves consideration of what the 
future world would look like and the past might have been absent of the conduct. It is 
inherently a speculative exercise that will often give rise to various competing 
interests.  
 
It prohibits acquisition of shares or assets conditionally. The condition is that the 
effect or likely effect of the acquisition will be to substantially lessen competition in a 
market. That condition in itself imports uncertain judgments about the post-
acquisition state of competition in the market where those judgments are required to 
be made before or after acquisition. Such judgments may require consideration of the 
likely responses of other rivals or potential rivals in the market. The uncertainty has 
not rendered the section non-justiciable.  
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Furthermore, companies of a size sufficient to risk being in breach of the merger 
provisions are already well acquainted in dealing with stringent regulatory 
requirements and some uncertainty. For example, the Australian Commissioner of 
Taxation has long been afforded the power to conduct audits and risk reviews on large 
corporates looking back four years, or, when serious cases of tax avoidance are 
suspected, the Commissioner has no limit on how far back the review period may be 
extended. Under other areas of taxation law companies are obligated to keep written 
evidence for five years and not doing so can result in significant penalties.304 Cases of 
continued neglect to meet this obligation may be referred to the Department of Public 
Prosecutions for prosecution.305 Likewise, the Corporations Act requires financial 
records be kept for up to seven years.306 These records must correctly record and 
explain the company’s transactions and financial position and performance.307 As 
much of this information would overlap with the requirements of the ACCC under 
this provision, it is unlikely further risk or resourcing expense will need to be factored 
in. 
 
To mitigate some of this uncertainty however, a more lenient two year specified 
period is proposed. This is considered a more reasonable and workable timeframe as 
it is unlikely competition and market dynamics would change drastically within this 
time period.  
 
From an administrative perspective, the substantially lessening of competition test, 
supported by this additional merger factor will still require that the acquisition, on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 288-25. 
305 ATO Practice Statement Law Administration 2005/2. 
306 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 286(3). 
307 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 286(1). 
109	  
	  
balance of probabilities, have a meaningful or relevant impact on the competitive 
process over time, not merely a short-term effect, which was to be assessed by 
reference to commercial realities and not hypothetical theories.308 As with all merger 
factors there will also be a high level of discretion in the hands of the ACCC in 
relation to the significance and apportionment of weight that will be placed on each 
merger factor. The ACCC may also exercise its discretion in such a manner as to 
minimise possible extra costs and burdens. This will be determined on a case-by-case 
basis and will depend on the actual matter under investigation and the governance and 
compliance history of the company under review. If costs stand to become a concern, 
the ACCC may examine whether in individual circumstances it is at all necessary or 
probative to consider previous acquisitions, and the extent that those acquisitions need 
to be examined. It may be the instance that only one merger in a chain of 10 mergers 
conducted over the two-year period is of concern, thus the ACCC may only require 
the target firm to retrieve information relating to that single case. Likewise, the ACCC 
may only be concerned with certain mergers conducted over an identified six-month 
period. In the same way, information of all transactions conducted over the full two-
year limitation period may not always be necessary.   
 
A two-year period is not a new or experimental concept amongst international merger 
regulation. As discussed in Chapter Four, Article 5(2) subparagraph 2 of the ECMR 
provides a specific rule that allows the Commission to consider successive 
transactions taking place within a two-year period between the same persons or 
undertakings to be treated as one and the same concentration arising on the date of the 
last transaction irrespective of whether or not those transactions relate to parts of the 
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same business or concern the same sector.309 Likewise, section 29 of the Enterprise 
Act 2002 (UK) regulates the obtaining of control through successive acquisitions 
within a two-year period.  
 
Thorough and clear guidelines provide unifying themes that increase certainty. 
Guidelines must explain the intent of the policy and provide necessary guidance to the 
ACCC and the courts on how to operate. If the regulation of anti-competitive creeping 
acquisitions were more readily interpreted the burden that arises from enforcement 
and compliance would be alleviated. Professor Allan Fels, commented: ‘It would be 
useful if the law more explicitly addressed creeping acquisitions.’  
 
Introducing a merger factor with the theme of considering previous acquisitions will 
strengthen the analytical tool that is the counterfactual and go towards clearly 
informing business. In this context, the ACCC will continue to provide a range of 
opportunities for consultation, so that uncertainty can be reduced during the corporate 
planning process, which in turn reduces the risk that socially worthwhile projects will 
be abandoned. 
 
The addition of a merger factor explicitly addressing creeping acquisitions into 
s 50(3) of the CCA is the strongest model for addressing creeping acquisitions. The 
proposed model widens the ACCC’s parameters, reducing ‘regulatory oversight of 
small acquisitions over time’.310 Such a scheme facilitates a more holistic snapshot of 
the market, and the acquirer’s actions pre-merger to determine whether the mergers 
constitute creeping acquisitions that have the effect of substantially lessening 
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competition. However, the proposed model should not be viewed as a universal 
remedy to address the complex issue of creeping acquisitions as, with any regulation, 
there may still be associated practical problems. The remainder of this article will 
discuss ancillary safeguards aimed at mitigating, deterring and regulating this 
practice.  
  
III  LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS BEYOND SECTION 50 
 
Mandatory notification and Commissioner’s declarations may provide further 
benefits. 
 
A Mandatory Notification 
 
The 2008 Merger Guidelines merely encourage merging parties to notify the ACCC if 
‘the merged firm will have a post-merger market share of greater than 20 per cent in 
the relevant market’. As this is purely voluntary,311 in practice, parties are actually 
permitted to proceed with a transaction that exceeds the merger control thresholds 
without seeking any regulatory consideration. 
 
As early as 1992, the Cooney Committee recommended a mandatory pre-notification 
scheme be introduced in Australia.312 Notification thresholds screen out transactions 
that are unlikely to result in appreciable competitive effects in a given jurisdiction, 
thus avoiding unnecessary transaction costs as well as the commitment of competition 
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agency resources without any corresponding enforcement benefit.313 Currently, if the 
ACCC opposes a merger that is bought to it by voluntary notification, the merger 
parties are very unlikely to proceed given the prospect of injunctions being brought by 
the ACCC under section 80(1A) of the CCA, and possible litigation. Moreover, ‘the 
fast commercial pace of mergers and acquisitions is not conducive to lengthy 
litigation.314 Parties’ preference for the administrative process of the ACCC, the 
informal clearance and authorisation procedures, results in the ACCC applying the 
Guidelines largely free from costly and time consuming judicial supervision.315 
Notification is a very effective tool. However, its voluntary nature limits its 
effectiveness. Introducing a regime of mandatory notification for mergers would be 
beneficial in the successful regulation of large firms participating in the practice of 
creeping acquisitions with the intention of circumventing s 50 of the CCA. 
 
Notification gives the regulator time to challenge a merger and seek modifications if 
necessary. The measure is not about punishment, but open and effective consultation. 
The benefit for the notifying entity being that it avoids the costly, potentially 
embarrassing and complicated process of seeking an order through the courts to 
unwind a merger after it has occurred.316 This is a proactive regime that acknowledges 
that it is often impossible to restore competition fully once an anti-competitive merger 
takes place. 
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The dominant pre-merger notification model follows the US Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 USC 18a (1976) (HSR Act), which requires certain 
types of transactions to be notified to the FTC and the DoJ. The DoJ and the FTC 
jointly administer a statutory notification procedure for proposed mergers over a 
US$50 million threshold. The HSR Act requires certain types of transactions to be 
notified to the FTC and DoJ before they occur.317 The FTC or DoJ may approve the 
merger – providing immunity from challenges – or seek a court order to veto it. The 
stated purpose of the HSR Act is to give the regulators 30 days’ notice of substantial 
mergers, which permits either agency to seek an injunction or pursue further 
investigation. They may also, and often do permit the merger to proceed in that time. 
Until those 30 days expire, parties may not complete the transaction unless the 
government has granted early termination of the waiting period. Whether a particular 
acquisition is subject to these requirements depends on the value of the acquisition 
and the size of the parties, as measured by their sales and assets. Fines are possible for 
failure to notify.  
 
In the US, the program has been a success. Commentators have noted that ‘[i]t is not 
hyperbole that perhaps the greatest US export in the last decade has been the adoption 
of pre-merger review processes.’318 The FTC reports that compliance with the Act’s 
notification requirements has been excellent and has minimised the number of post-
merger challenges the enforcement agencies have had to pursue.319 Although the 
agencies retain the power to challenge mergers post-consummation, and will do so 
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under appropriate circumstances, the fact that they rarely do has led many members of 
the private bar to view the program as a helpful tool in advising their clients about 
acquisitions proposed.320 These same outcomes are likely to be reported in Australia. 
In the EU Community, the requirements have been similar since 1990. The 
differences between the various notification procedures are mostly in details of 
thresholds for notification.  
 
Interestingly, Hungary for example, when calculating turnovers and undertakings, all 
acquisitions from the same group within two years preceding the acquisition of 
control by the acquirer group must be considered if the acquisitions were at that time 
not subject to notification.321 In this circumstance, there is an incentive to notify from 
the outset or be exposed to more onerous thresholds later on. 
 
In Australia, the relevant authority to be notified and to undertake examination will be 
the ACCC. It is logical to continue to use thresholds already in use by the ACCC – 
‘when the merged firm will have a post-merger market share of greater than 20 per 
cent in the relevant market’ or ‘in the case of concentrated markets any market where 
the HHI has exceeded 2000’ – to compel merging parties to notify. 322 Alternatively, a 
threshold similar to that implemented by the US regime that requires notification 
when a specified monetary value of assets is involved in the merger could be 
developed. What is important here is not so much the exact threshold, but that 
mergers susceptible to anti-competitive consequences are examined. For the most 
part, the majority of mergers will not be hindered or affected by the implementation 
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of this regime, but those few that are of concern will be brought to the attention of 
regulators.  
 
There is concern that introducing mandatory pre-merger notification would overload 
the ACCC’s resources resulting in significant delay. As such, a reasonable time frame 
– not necessarily 30 days – will need to be worked out. It is necessary for this 
timeframe to be codified in statute so as to afford protection to merging parties from 
undue delay. As a side note, one would argue if an economy on the scale of the US 
can adhere to a 30-day assessment period, there is no reason why Australia’s 
significantly smaller economy cannot also adhere to that assessment period.  
 
The current absence in the CCA of a notification requirement is a major failure. 
 
B Commissioner’s Declarations 
 
Somewhat similar to the pre-merger notification regime is the Commissioner’s 
declaration process. This declaration process confers power upon the Commissioner 
to declare concern for potential or actual competitive harm at the hands of a specific 
corporation or entire industry. The declaration process would give the ACCC power 
to keep a specified ‘watching brief’ on declared companies or industries that exceed 
certain market share thresholds or have the very real potential to participate in 
unscrupulous business practices. Such thresholds do not constitute an automatic 
declaration of market dominance, nor are they an automatic signal as to the existence 
of anti-competitive practices or of an abuse of power. They act instead as a warning 
beacon to the regulator to maintain a watching brief on the company or industry 
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concerned. 
 
Once triggered, the ACCC would notify the identified company that it must advise the 
ACCC of all market acquisition activity, with specific requirements to report to the 
ACCC annually. The ACCC could then, of its own volition, review the company or 
the industry concerned.323 At the discretion of the Commissioner, additional 
prohibitions for a set period of time may be declared upon corporations or industries. 
In the most severe cases, these extra regulatory interventions could take the form of 
price ceilings or price floors. 
 
A price floor stipulates a minimum price that can be charged for a good or service. In 
the past, governments have imposed price floors to help the suppliers of goods and 
services. The Australian Government, for example, operated the Wool Price 
Stabilisation Scheme until 1991 to prevent the price of wool falling below a certain 
level. Likewise, in the labour market, the government requires employers pay workers 
a wage no less than the regulated minimum.324 
 
Applying this to the grocery sector, during the Milk Wars of 2010 the Commissioner 
could have temporarily established a watching brief of the industry. In response to the 
price of milk dropping to $1, the Commissioner could have declared a floor minimum 
price that a producer may not sell to a wholesaler, and a wholesaler may not sell to a 
retailer. Then the major supermarkets could not demand that farmers and wholesalers, 
including their own private label providers, supply milk to them cheaper than the 
minimum price regulated by the Commissioner. This types of price control could 
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constrain the major supermarket chains from demanding to be charged so little for 
supply and also charging consumers so little for these products in an attempt to 
squeeze out the competitors.  
 
A price ceiling on the other hand, is a maximum price at which a good can be bought. 
Governments impose price ceilings in response to complaints that the market price is 
too high. The purpose is to help consumers who must pay the prices. For example, the 
US Government controlled oil prices in the early 1970s stipulating that US firms 
could not charge more than a stated maximum price of US$5.25 per barrel of crude 
oil; the equilibrium price was well over US$10 per barrel at that time.  
 
Price ceilings have previously been utilised in the Australian National Electricity 
Market (NEM). The established specialised regulator is the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER) – a body of the ACCC. The AER’s responsibilities include the 
economic regulation of the electricity transmission and distribution networks in the 
NEM.325 Importantly for our analysis, the AER sets a ceiling on the revenues or prices 
that the owner or operator of a transmission or distribution network can earn or charge 
during a five year regulatory period.326 In the NEM, the Transmission Network 
Service Provider must submit to the AER a revenue proposal and a proposed pricing 
methodology relating to its transmission services. The AER must assess whether the 
proposed pricing methodology is consistent with the pricing principles for prescribed 
transmission services outlined in rule 6A.23 of the National Electricity Rules (NER) 
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and the AER’s pricing methodology guidelines.327 Similar considerations will need to 
be taken into account when apportioning running costs and productions costs to the 
final recommended price enforced by the grocery price regulator. 
 
As an alternative, the Commissioner, using the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) or other industry relevant information, could set a 
recommended price percentile deviation within which suppliers are permitted to sell 
the same product to different retailers. This regulation would restrain the amount by 
which a price offered by a vertically integrated wholesaler to an independent retailer 
can deviate from that offered to a subsidiary retailer. By not fixing a price but rather a 
flexible median and deviation, the market is given room to fluctuate naturally whether 
from the effects of supply and demand or gradual inflation. 
 
For the purpose of the above intervention, all levels of the supply chain – producer, 
wholesaler and retailer – within vertically integrated enterprises must be treated as 
separate entities. The object of this regulation would be to eliminate unfair price 
discrimination where vertically integrated firms supply their own downstream firms 
on more favourable terms than they do competitor independent firms. This would 
increase competition as the independent retailer will receive goods on similar terms or 
within a reasonable range of the same price as the vertically integrated networks. 
 
In determining the revenues or prices that a supplier may charge, the regulator would 
be required to forecast the revenue requirement of a business to cover its efficient 
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costs328 and provide a commercial return on capital.329 The difficulty in defining costs 
has always been in deciding how operating costs might be apportioned to individual 
products. It is clear that the cost to a supplier of any product sold is a product of 
invention. Not just of the purchase price paid for the product in question, but also of 
the operating costs associated in bringing the product to the market – costs such as 
wages, light, heating, rent, rates, transport, insurance and so on. When all costs have 
been paid, whatever is left over is the net margin or profit.330 
 
To make this workable and ensure the forces of competition are still at work in the 
market, it is important to note that suppliers would not be compelled to trade at that 
minimum price; it would merely set a limit below which they cannot reasonably sell a 
product below. Standard terms and conditions in each individual supply contract 
would typically include supplier’s price lists and credit terms for different classes of 
customers. This may include specific discounts and rebates that are available to reflect 
the quantity and value of goods purchased as well as economies and efficiencies in 
the production or distribution system. It may also include discounts for the promotion 
of individual products by the retailer, long-term agreements, and allowances for direct 
debit payments or for payment on time.331 Therefore, it is still possible for a large or 
more efficient retailer, by virtue of the size of its operation, to retain greater 
negotiating power than an inefficient competitor. To avoid ‘secretive’ discounts being 
placed off invoice for favoured retailers such as vertically integrated downstream 
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firms, it would be a requirement that retailers are not permitted to sell at a price less 
than the price on the invoice provided by the supplier.  
 
At the satisfaction of the Commissioner, a declared entity or industry may be 
‘undeclared’ and alleviated of any additional compliance obligations conferred upon 
it by declaration. To ensure transparency and fairness, the legislation could include a 
maximum consecutive time period that an entity or industry may remain declared 
without review. This will prevent entities or industries from becoming stagnant or 
unappealing to potential future investment.  
 
The declaration process is another proactive measure to prevent the market from ever 
reaching the point where concentration through creeping acquisitions is occurring. 
The threat of such regulatory intervention alone may address many of the flow-on 
issues associated with creeping acquisitions.  
 
Importantly, the Commissioner’s declaration is not a laying of guilt, but merely a 
focus of extra attention upon those entities or industries displaying the conditions 
susceptible to this type of anti-competitive acquisition. A declaration does not prevent 
declared firms or industries from continuing to grow and expand. The primary 
objective of the declaration program is to shine light on problematic and potentially 
detrimental industries and firms. This extra attention is an incredibly persuasive 
deterrent should those with declared status have in contemplation anti-competitive 
conduct. Regardless of whether that be organic or through merger and acquisition, as 
long as it is within the bounds of Australia’s competition law policy it will be 
permitted to proceed. This policy only becomes restrictive where the growth is 
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occurring by anti-competitive means. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
Economic growth and prosperity involves a continuing process of structural change. 
Robust and effective competition law is an important element of business regulation 
in Australia and careful market design and management can deliver market systems 
that maximise benefits of those reforms while minimising costs and disruptions to 
consumers. It is vitally important that competition authorities have a means by which 
to regulate creeping acquisitions in order to protect consumers and promote 
competition without discouraging economic development and growth. Failing to deal 
with creeping acquisitions undermines competition and without such a law Australia 
cannot have the world’s best competition framework.332 
 
This article has suggested a number of reforms that support introducing an additional 
merger factor (j) into s 50(3) of the CCA to enable the ACCC to assess the cumulative 
effect of current and previous acquisitions. In such a situation, an acquisition notified 
to the ACCC would be judged, not only on the basis of its effect on competition, but 
on the cumulative effect of it and prior acquisitions. Ancillary recommendations have 
also been proposed. These include a contemporary interpretation that enlarges the 
objects of the CCA to explicitly permit prohibition based on anti-competitive 
intentions towards small enterprise, introducing a mandatory notification regime for 
mergers that breach high risk thresholds and Commissioner’s declarations that bestow 
a watching brief and extra regulatory obligations on high risk entities or entire 
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industries. The article encourages the adoption of multiple models in parallel. For 
example, in such a situation, an acquisition notified to the ACCC under the mandatory 
notification provisions or as the result of a declaration would be assessed, not only on 
the basis of its effect on competition, but on the cumulative effect of it and prior 
acquisitions. 
 
Competition law is an economic law that must evolve with our understanding of how 
the economy functions. Adapting merger analysis to this purpose in the manner 
suggested above is a task which the ACCC and legislature must undertake. 
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CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION 
 
Creeping acquisitions find their livelihood in a loophole in Australia’s current merger 
regime. In certain industries, firms with significant market power are able to use this 
practice to continue to grow in dominance often at the detriment of incumbents or, 
ultimately, consumers. Implementing a practice of creeping acquisitions conceals the 
true intention of the acquiring firm such that if the same dominance and detriment 
were to occur in a more rudimentary fashion of merger and acquisition, it would 
likely be contested and prohibited by the ACCC through the CCA.  
 
In competition law theory, there seems no logical reason why a series of small 
mergers by a single entity that have the combined effect of substantially lessening 
competition should escape prohibition when a single merger having the same impact 
on the market does not. 
 
Australia’s competition authority, the ACCC, has repeatedly confirmed that creeping 
acquisitions are a concerning issue and they are not equipped with sufficient power 
under the CCA to address this practice. The ACCC affirmed that action would need to 
be taken in this regard to protect future markets and consumers.333 
 
In the previous Chapter, a number of recommendations to counteract this anti-
competitive corporate behaviour have been presented. These revolved around the 
introduction of an additional merger factor (j) into s 50(3) of the CCA. This would 
enable the ACCC to assess the cumulative effect of the current and previous 
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acquisitions. In such a situation, an acquisition notified to the ACCC would be 
judged, not only on the basis of its effect on competition, but on the cumulative effect 
of it and prior acquisitions. Ancillary recommendations have also been proposed. 
These include a contemporary interpretation that enlarges the objects of the CCA to 
explicitly permit prohibition based on anti-competitive intentions towards small 
enterprise, introducing a mandatory notification regime for mergers that breach high 
risk thresholds and Commissioner’s declarations that bestow a watching brief and 
extra regulatory obligations on high risk entities or entire industries. 
 
The overarching theme is that Australia must have a competition and consumer law 
framework that adequately protects against the dangers inherent in creeping 
acquisitions. Appropriate regulation of creeping acquisitions is essential to ensure a 
practice that has been largely unregulated in Australia for over 30 years does not 
continue to interfere with the efficient functioning of markets. 
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